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ABSTRACT 
Debate exists about how much alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) is 
used in courts and about the metrics by which to evaluate its impact. Yet on two 
measures—the volume of rulemaking and the privatization of court-based 
interactions—the results are unambiguous: courts have promulgated hundreds of 
rules governing ADR, and those rules rarely protect rights of the public to know 
much about either the processes or the results. Rather, court-based procedural 
rules are increasingly becoming contract-promoting rules, encouraging parties 
to conclude disputes without adjudication. 
In this essay in honor of Professor Stephen Subrin, I explore the centrality of 
“open courts” to judicial legitimacy. Courts provide opportunities for democratic 
engagements with the production and application of law. The public’s right of 
access to observe proceedings in courts sustains judicial independence, 
legitimates public investments in the judiciary, and offers routes to oversight 
                                                        
*  Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. © Judith Resnik, 2015. All rights 
reserved. Thanks are due to the conveners, Thomas Main and Margaret Woo—for inviting 
me to join in marking the contributions of Stephen Subrin, and thereby enabling me to have 
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exploring the norms of adjudication and for teaching us all so much. This essay builds on 
Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy and Rights in City-States and Democratic 
Courtrooms, written with Dennis E. Curtis (2011); Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” 
“Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 226 (2011); and a few 
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in my article, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in 
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when courts fail to live up to obligations to treat disputants fairly. These 
constitutional values ought to inform the shape of procedural innovations in 
courts. Court-based arbitration and court-based settlement programs, like court-
based trials, should be regulated to reflect the constitutional obligations to 
provide a role for the public. 
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I. PROCEDURAL ASPIRATIONS 
What makes an institution a court, and what makes a procedural system 
legitimate? The answers are neither atemporal nor apolitical but embedded in 
changing practices of adjudication and in interpretations of the constitutional 
obligations of judges. 
These contingencies, along with the dynamism and the vulnerability of 
courts, are at the center of this essay, honoring Stephen Subrin for his 
leadership in exploring the norms of procedure. In his 1999 article, On 
Thinking About A Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure,1 Professor 
Subrin identified the central “values and goals” of the procedural system in the 
United States. His requirements (in this order) were that a procedural system 
resolves disputes “peacefully”; that it does so efficiently; that it fulfills 
“societal norms through law-application”; that it provides an “accurate 
ascertainment of facts” and “predictability”; that it “enhanc[es] human 
dignity”; that it “add[s] legitimacy and stability to government and society”; 
that it “permit[s] citizens to partake in governance”; that it aids in “the growth 
and improvement of law”; and that it works by “restraining or enhancing 
power.”2 
Given his focus on the United States, Subrin’s analysis implicitly addresses 
the attributes of a procedural system in a democracy built on citizen-
sovereignty as well as on the need for dispute resolution. In light of 
                                                        
1  Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure, 7 
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139 (1999) [hereinafter Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of 
a Country’s Civil Procedure]. 
2  Id. at 140. 
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democracy’s commitments to egalitarian opportunities for participation in the 
body politic and to the constrained and accountable exercise of government 
power, specification of another attribute—publicity—is in order.3 That term, 
borrowed from Jeremy Bentham,4 represents ideas which became central to 
American political thought and to courts’ procedures as state and federal 
constitutions welcomed and protected public access to open courts. 
To analyze the roles played by the public, I first sketch the history of the 
development of the norm of publicity and its instantiation in the United States 
through constitutional texts insisting on open courts. These provisions protect 
two kinds of access rights—for potential claimants and for third parties, free to 
attend and observe proceedings. As I explore, an important relationship exists 
between publicity in courts and the qualities of courts that merit describing 
them as democratic. Thereafter, I examine the ways in which state and federal 
procedural systems, focused on trials in courthouses, once made public 
observation relatively easy, reducing the need for much reflection on the law 
and theory undergirding such practices. 
Second, I turn to twentieth-century procedural reforms, which facilitated 
claimants’ access to courts and yet contributed to the reshaping of judicial work 
in a fashion that has come to undercut the role played by the public. In terms of 
the aspect of open courts welcoming claimants, the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were door-opening, as they simplified ways to file lawsuits and 
expanded techniques for gathering information. Yet the 1938 Rules also posed 
a challenge to the other aspect of open courts—the capacity of third parties to 
participate through direct observation. By creating a pretrial phase focused on 
lawyer-judge meetings, the Federal Rules led the way for the development of a 
litigation system in which trials became rare and key interactions took place 
outside the courtroom. 
Nonetheless, the 1938 Rules also provided new routes for the public to 
gain insights into, and to participate in, norm development. The Rules’ 
innovative system of forced-information exchanges through reciprocal 
obligations of discovery generated insights into a host of government and 
corporate activities. The 1966 revisions facilitating class actions enabled 
aggregation of various kinds of claims and, in conjunction with common law 
and statutory fee-shifting rules, supported an expansion of the plaintiffs’ bar. 
The litigations that the Rules helped to spawn generated a wealth of public 
                                                        
3  See JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code, in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 41 
(John Bowring ed., 1843); FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 26–27 (1983); Anthony J. Draper, 
‘Corruptions in the Administration of Justice’: Bentham’s Critique of Civil Procedure, 
1806–1811, 7 J. BENTHAM STUD. 1 (2004). 
4  See JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827), 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 351–80 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial 
Evidence]. 
1634 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1631  
information, as the materials filed in court were presumptively available for 
public review. 
Government-subsidized adjudication and the authority to bring claims 
render courts redistributive. Procedural reforms in the twentieth century 
augmented the resources of all kinds of disputants (be they corporate 
defendants or employees, prison officials or prisoners) by easing access and 
facilitating the exchange of information. Litigants who had limited resources 
before entering the marketplace of law benefitted enormously from the 
constitutional, statutory, and rule developments that provided new routes to 
court and new rights in court. 
Conflicts about the role to be played by courts ensued, illustrating the 
redistributive impact of open courts and how courts can function as a means of 
sparking public debates about the uses and limits of law. Reformers with 
diverse agendas pressed for refashioning rules. Some sought to respond to the 
volume of claimants by augmenting the methods for pursuing alleged violations 
of rights, for example through class action reforms. Others aimed to curb the 
capacity of individuals and groups to be claimants. 
Beginning in the 1980s, procedural revisions pushed significant aspects of 
court-based dispute resolution out of sight. The Federal Rules were amended to 
provide that discovery materials were no longer routinely filed in courts unless 
appended to motions, and pre-discovery confidentiality agreements became 
routine.5 Other amendments promoted various modes of “alternative dispute 
resolution” (“ADR”), including settlement conferences, mediation, and court-
annexed arbitration. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure once posited ADR as 
an “extrajudicial” activity, pursued by the parties or through referrals to 
mediators outside the courthouse. But the revisions of the 1980s and 1990s 
brought ADR in-house. New mandates put judges to work promoting and at 
times participating in various forms of ADR. 
To be sure, there is much to fix in courts, which ought not to be idealized 
or posited as the sole path to or the embodiment of justice.6 Entry barriers are 
                                                        
5  See generally Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery 
Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2014). This article surveyed cases on the sharing of 
information obtained in discovery, the use of “return-or-destroy” provisions required as a 
predicate either to discovery or to settlement, and a relaxed standard for granting protective 
orders of disclosures made. Benham called for rules building in the sharing of discovery as 
part of the goal of increasing the efficiency of litigation. He argued that his proposals fit the 
paradigm of Federal Rule amendments addressing proportionality as a test of the permissible 
scope of discovery. Id. Members of Congress have proposed, but not obtained enactment of, 
obligations to make more materials available. See, e.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, 
S. 2364, 113th Cong. (2014). 
6  See HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 
148–66 (1999); Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way 
Courts Regulate Legal Markets, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 83, 83 (“The vast majority of 
ordinary Americans lack any real access to the legal system for resolving their claims and 
the claims made against them.”). 
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significant,7 and the judicial process can be used to work unfairness. Illustrative 
is one study of 4,400 lawsuits filed by debt buyers in Maryland courts; 
unrepresented debtors regularly defaulted on amounts owed (averaging about 
$3000), all processed through courts that did not insist on judicial oversight or 
inquiries to check on the documents proffered.8 Courts are also the source of 
debt, as their user fees and fines can produce cycles of payments due, and even 
imprisonment for contempt of court as a result of nonpayments.9 The pains that 
courts can inflict became vivid in Ferguson, Missouri, as detailed in the 2015 
Department of Justice account of how the municipal court in Ferguson10 
worked in tandem with the police to maximize the locality’s revenues through 
“constitutionally deficient” procedures that had a racially biased impact.11 
One lesson from Ferguson is the importance of public insight into the 
processes of courts. Documentation of the failures comes in part because of 
court obligations to maintain records and to permit public observation—
opening paths to correct injustices, if popular will to do so exists.12 Thus, the 
developments of so many rules privatizing the exchanges between judges and 
disputants in ordinary civil litigation requires exploration of a third topic: the 
role of the public in ADR. 
Ferreting out ADR’s relationship to the public proves to be difficult 
because the rules of ADR rarely identify obligations to the public. Reviews of 
hundreds of provisions at the local levels in federal and state courts, as well as 
interviews with court staff, were required to understand the place of the public 
in ADR.13 What that research demonstrates is that, to the extent rules address 
                                                        
7  The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, for example, precludes 
many employees and consumers from participating in class actions or going individually to 
court; instead, these potential claimants are required to use dispute resolution systems 
stipulated in job application forms or in documents accompanying purchases or the use of 
credit cards. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, 
the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) [hereinafter 
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]. 
8  Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt 
Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179 (2014). Ninety-eight percent of the defaulting 
debtors lacked counsel. Id. at 208–09. 
9  See ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR  
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 13–26 (2010),  
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines 
%20FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J3AR-KRU2. 
10  CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 42–62 (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa 
/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9EKY-NS43. 
11  Id. at 42, 68–69. 
12  The breaches in Ferguson included the court’s failure to make public all it was required to 
do. Id. at 97–98. 
13  My understanding has deepened as a result of the thorough research of a group of 
students, who combed rules and called clerks’ offices as we tried to ferret out the ways in 
which ADR rules deal with public access. See Memorandum from Mark Kelley, Chris 
Milione & Devon Porter to Judith Resnik, Court-Annexed Arbitration (Apr. 28, 2014) 
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the public or third parties, the purpose is generally to ensure confidentiality. As 
currently practiced, ADR makes most of its processes and outcomes 
inaccessible. Even as ADR takes place inside courthouses, it is generally 
outside the public purview and it displaces public adjudication. 
The fourth issue is the import of the law and history of public adjudication 
to court-based ADR. The constitutional framework for public access to court-
based activities stems from First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights as 
well as from clauses in state and federal constitutions establishing the judicial 
branch and from common law traditions. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
articulated a presumption of openness for criminal trials and related activities, 
such as voir dire. The Court has not expressly decided rights of the public to 
observe civil litigation, but lower courts have read the Court’s precedent to 
require access to civil litigation analogous to that accorded for criminal 
litigation. The Court’s approach, predicated on the First Amendment, invokes 
historical experiences of courts as public venues and the values of the resulting 
public exchanges, understood in Benthamite terms as instilling confidence and 
providing accountability.14 Judges describe the analysis as a mix of 
“experience” (practices over time) and “logic” (the claimed benefits of 
openness or closure).15 
ADR complicates this doctrinal approach. ADR shifts the experiences in 
courts and justifies privacy as useful to reach agreements that, when predicated 
on consent, are argued as vitiating the need for accountability to third parties. 
As closed ADR procedures become the modality of judges in civil litigation, 
courts lose their capacity to serve as one of many venues constituting the public 
sphere and facilitating debates about law’s reach. Instead, courts turn into 
dispute resolution systems largely shielded from public oversight and 
competing for filings with private sector providers.16 
The difficulty with courts remitting decision-making to private ordering in 
a neo-liberal fashion is that it undermines the unique form of state authority 
that courts provide. Judges gain legitimacy from being embedded in public 
exchanges as they exercise the power to direct the reallocation of property and 
the reorganization of families as well as to impose limitations on liberty. Courts 
are “a huge information system—an entity that receives, processes, stores, 
                                                                                                                                
[hereinafter Kelly, Milione & Porter, Memo, Court-Annexed Arbitration] (on file with the 
author); Memorandum from Michael Clemente, Mark Kelley, Jonas Wang & Benjamin 
Woodring to Judith Resnik, Confidentiality, ADR, and Local Rules (October 1, 2014) (on 
file with the author). Thereafter, we returned to confirm information with many courts, and 
Bonnie Posick reviewed the local rules. 
14  See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 507–08 
(1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1980). See generally 
BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 4. 
15  These terms appear in many decisions. See, e.g., Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 
733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014); N.Y. Civil Liberties 
Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298–99 (2d Cir. 2011). 
16  See also Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 7 at 2806–54. 
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creates, monitors, and disseminates large quantities of documents and 
information.”17 Substantive law and the values of procedural rights are being 
effectuated, applied, engaged, undermined, or ignored in dispute resolutions 
based in courts—with and without adjudication.18 If third parties have no 
access to the processes and the impact of judges’ actions (whether they are 
working in their roles as mediators, managers, or adjudicators), the rationales 
for judicial legitimacy, independence, and for significant public subsidies to 
courts weaken. 
Therefore, when courts require disputants to participate in court-based 
settlement programs and court-based arbitration in the hopes that both will 
obviate the need for court-based trials, courts ought to shape public dimensions 
for these alternatives. As bargaining becomes a requirement of the law (rather 
than an activity in its shadow), judges need to take responsibility for the 
resulting agreements. The denouement of lawsuits, shepherded by judges 
pressing for accords to disputes, are not the equivalent of negotiated contracts 
created by parties seeking each other out to generate mutual benefits.  As the 
rules of procedure turn into a set of practices promoting contracts,19 
constitutional regulation must follow to insist on a role for the public so as to 
protect the opportunities courts provide for democratic engagements with the 
production of law and to justify the independence of judges and the authority of 
and resources devoted to courts. 
II. THE CHANGING “VALUES AND GOALS” OF OPEN COURTS 
The custom of open adjudicatory processes has a long history. Roman law 
conceived of criminal proceedings as “res publica”—a public event.20 
Centuries later, as cities developed, dispute resolution was one of the basic 
functions of government; indeed, some argue the formation of cities in 
Medieval times stemmed from the need to deal with conflicts so as to facilitate 
commerce and provide a modicum of peace and security.21 
                                                        
17  RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 
201 (2008). 
18  The role of adjudication in information production is central to Louis Kaplow’s article, 
Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1303 
(2015). 
19  See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005). 
20  See BRUCE W. FRIER, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN JURISTS: STUDIES IN CICERO’S PRO 
CAECINA (1985); J.A. CROOK, LEGAL ADVOCACY IN THE ROMAN WORLD (1995). 
21  See, e.g., Mario Sbriccoli, Legislation, Justice and Political Power in Italian Cities, 
1200–1400, in LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE 37, 42–44 (Antonio Padoa-Schioppa ed., 1997). 
Sbriccoli traced the movement in the thirteenth century toward an inquisitorial posture that 
displaced private ordering (“vendettas, duels, and private alliances”) with “ ‘reasons for 
(public) justice’,” such that justice became “one of the criteria by which the effectiveness of 
government power was measured.” Id. at 49–50; see also Clive Holmes, The Legal 
Instruments of Power and the State in Early Modern England, in LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE, 
supra, at 269–89. 
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Local rulers of various kinds regularly displayed their authority to make 
and enforce rules through public performances of their adjudicatory powers. 
But their processes relied on conceptions of judges, litigants, and the public that 
were very different than those in democratic polities. Then, judges were styled 
loyal servants of the states, subject to kingly (and godly) rule, rather than 
independent actors entitled to pronounce judgment on behalf of the state. 
Litigants depended on the grace of rulers to be eligible to participate in courts, 
and not all persons were authorized to bring suits, to testify, to serve as 
professional or lay judges, or to assert claims for protection of their person and 
property. In contrast to the modern notions that each person is a juridical equal 
and that the state is obliged to subject itself to scrutiny, the point of open 
procedures then was to impress on viewers the power of the state to compel 
obedience to its edicts. 
Yet even in eras before popular sovereignty, public procedures produced 
complex interactions between the public and the state. Executions offer one 
such example, illuminating not only the capacity of the state to enforce its laws 
through dramatic punishments,22 but also the potential for spectators to exercise 
power as well. In England, executions “lurched chaotically between death and 
laughter” amidst carnivalesque atmospheres that undermined the “script” of a 
solemn ritual of state authority.23 Mikhail Bakhtin saw large crowds producing 
“the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions.”24 
Given the tumult, hangings could only take place “with the tacit consent of the 
crowd.”25 One way to control the crowds was to relocate the act of punishment, 
moving it from city squares to prisons, offstage and outside the purview of the 
                                                        
22  In seventeenth-century Amsterdam, for example, the burgomasters staged the ceremony 
in which death sentences were pronounced in a ground floor room opened to onlookers, who 
were able to watch through windows of the Town Hall; executions followed thereafter out 
front. Katharine Fremantle, The Open Vierschaar of Amsterdam’s Seventeenth-Century 
Town Hall as a Setting for the City’s Justice, 77 OUD HOLLAND 206, 208 (1962). 
23  Thomas W. Laqueur, Crowds, Carnival and the State in English Executions, 1604–1868, 
in THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN ENGLISH HISTORY IN HONOUR OF LAWRENCE 
STONE 305, 309–311 (A.L. Beier, David Cannadine & James M. Rosenheim eds., 1989) 
[hereinafter THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY]. Laqueur examined graphic prints displaying the 
carnival-like atmosphere, suggesting that “from the audience’s perspective, executions were 
a species of festive comedy or light entertainment” with a theatricality that came to be 
parodied. Id. at 323–25. England was not unique in this regard. See generally SAMUEL Y. 
EDGERTON, JR., PICTURES AND PUNISHMENT: ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING THE 
FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE (1985). 
24  MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND HIS WORLD 10 (Hélène Iswolsky trans., 1984). 
25  Laqueur, supra note 23, at 352. Public executions stopped in England in the late 1960s, 
and by 1965, the United Kingdom effectively abolished capital punishment itself. See 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71 (Eng.). Yet, as Foucault pointed out, 
the authority had already shifted its sites of operation. Governments cut out the crowds by 
incarcerating individuals in prisons removed from the public. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE 
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 7–8 (Vintage Books 2d ed., Alan Sheridan trans., 
1995) (1977). 
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public. That form of privatization, as Michel Foucault identified, expanded 
state power while escaping popular oversight.26 
Despite the vividness of execution scenes, scholars of the English legal 
system point out that “many more people of all ranks of society . . . came into 
contact with the legal system through the civil rather than the criminal 
courts.”27 The expansion of commerce, coupled with the growth in 
governments’ administrative activities and of the legal profession, brought 
increasingly diverse people into court. Just as spectators at executions 
responded, the audience watching court proceedings developed views about the 
legitimacy of the processes and of the decisions made. 
In the eighteenth century, the shift to popular sovereignty, exemplified by 
the French and American Revolutions, profoundly altered the expectations of 
courts and the obligations of judges. A return to Jeremy Bentham, who was 
formulating his thoughts on public participation in the early part of the 
nineteenth century, is thus in order. Bentham conceived of adjudication as a 
robust check on state authority. Deeply concerned about the self-interested 
actions of common law judges and lawyers, Bentham argued that publicity 
provided several benefits. A first was that, when the public was present, judges 
presiding at trial would themselves be “under trial.”28 Thus, as Michel Foucault 
later explicated, with public oversight comes the disciplinary power of 
surveillance.29 
Second, the immediacy of an audience would, Bentham thought, also turn 
judges into teachers and courts into “schools” as well as “theaters of justice.”30 
Bentham assumed that judges would want to explain their actions to the 
audience, who would learn why and how judgments were made. These 
                                                        
26  See FOUCAULT, supra note 25. The contemporary prison reform effort comes in part from 
the publicity produced from efforts to “stop solitary” confinement and to respond to violence 
inside prisons. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TEX., A SOLITARY FAILURE: THE 
WASTE, COST AND HARM OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN TEXAS (2015), available at 
http://aclutx.org/download/197. 
27  C.W. Brooks, Interpersonal Conflict and Social Tension: Civil Litigation in England, 
1640–1830, in THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 23, at 357, 357. Brooks also noted 
that eighteenth century rates of civil litigation were lower than in some prior eras. Id. at 396–
97. English history also included a brief period, in the 1760s, when both litigants and 
spectators had to pay fees to enter the galleries of the Old Bailey, London’s criminal court. 
See John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law, 1763–74: A Study of Radical Notions of 
Governance, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE: THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 128, 150 (John Brewer & John Styles eds., 
1980); Simon Devereaux, The City and the Sessions Paper: “Public Justice” in London, 
1770–1800, 35 J. BRIT. STUD. 466, 486 (1996). Another form of limited access was that not 
all the materials submitted were included in the records kept. Id. at 488. By way of 
illustration, between 1560 and 1640, “the number of lawyers (‘barristers’) qualified to 
practice before the central courts increased fourfold.” Holmes, supra note 21, at 273. 
28  See BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, supra note 4, at 355. See generally 
Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339. 
29  See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 25. 
30  BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 4, at 355. 
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different utilities turned publicity, for Bentham, into “the very soul of 
justice.”31 
The idea of the public as an authoritative overseer of the judiciary was part 
of a broader reconception of courts’ relationship to the body politic. 
Historically, judges served at the pleasure of the monarchs who appointed 
them. The English Act of Settlement of 1701 is one marker of shifting norms; 
judges no longer lost their commissions when the monarchy changed.32 A 
century later, Bentham argued that spectators ought to become active 
participants (“auditors” was his term),33 disseminating their own notes, taken 
without state control. The public could thus report on how judges treated all 
litigants, including when the government (which appointed judges) appeared 
before them. 
III. CONSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC 
The procedural system in the United States, which is at the core of 
Professor Subrin’s interests,34 embraced the idea of courts as public venues. 
The new states in North America constitutionalized “publicity” by mandating 
that “all courts shall be open.”35 What had been rituals of power became 
obligations of government, as provisions on open courts were regularly linked 
to clauses protecting rights-to-remedies for harms to property and person. 
Together, these guarantees generated two kinds of access: empowering 
individuals to bring claims to courts and authorizing third parties to watch 
proceedings in courts. The 1819 Alabama Constitution is one of many such 
texts, with its phrases echoing England’s Magna Carta, providing: “All courts 
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, 
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and 
justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay.”36 
                                                        
31  JEREMY BENTHAM, Bentham’s Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments, 
Compared with That of the National Assembly, with a Commentary on the Same, in 4 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 305, 316 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
32  David Lemmings, The Independence of the Judiciary in Eighteenth-Century England, in 
THE LIFE OF THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE, 
OXFORD 1991, at 125, 125–130 (Peter Birks ed., 1993). 
33  BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 4, at 355–56. 
34  Professor Subrin has sustained interests in global and comparative procedure as well. See 
Margaret Woo, Manning the Courthouse Gate: Pleadings, Jurisdiction, and the Nation-
State, 15 NEV. L.J. 1261 (2015). 
35  An overview of many such provisions can be found in Judith Resnik, Constitutional 
Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress 
Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917 (2012). 
36  ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 14. The current Alabama Constitution, ratified in 1901, has 
an almost identical clause. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“That all courts shall be open; and 
that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall 
have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without 
sale, denial, or delay.”). 
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Yet a reminder is in order. Courts in many states—North and South—were 
not then venues in which all persons were equal.37 Indeed, courts were 
institutions centered on the protection of property and status-conventional 
relationships, as was made painfully clear by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1856 
Dred Scott decision, holding that Harriet and Dred Scott could not seek redress 
in courts because they lacked legal personhood and juridical capacity.38 
The idea of courts as both sources of the recognition that all persons are 
equal rights-holders and as resources for the full array of humanity is an 
artifact of the First and Second Reconstructions. Not until well into the 
twentieth century did U.S. law and practice fully embrace the propositions that 
race, gender, and class did not preclude access to courts, that women and men 
of all colors could serve as jurors and judges, and that all participants were 
entitled to equal dignity and respect.39 Not only did all persons gain 
entitlements to courts, but the import of phrases guaranteeing rights-to-
remedies for “an injury to lands, goods, person, or reputation” changed. 
Examples include rights to be free from discrimination; rights for consumers, 
employees, and members of households; and the development of protections 
for the environment as well as for criminal defendants. 
The interaction between the constitutional obligations of earlier eras and 
developing commitments to equality turned courts into universal entitlements 
and, on occasion, pressed them to be deliberately redistributive as well. Once 
the government obliged itself to show “equal concern for the fate of every 
person over whom it claims dominion” (to borrow Ronald Dworkin’s 
description of equality’s entailments40), courts had new tasks. The promises of 
access and remedies become illusory when, for example, courts charge entry 
fees that systematically exclude sets of claimants and when government 
resources overwhelm opponents.41 
                                                        
37  For example, the Connecticut Constitution of 1818 had a similar set of guarantees. See 
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 12 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and 
right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”). 
Yet, while protecting rights to “open” courts and to “remedy by due course of law,” the 
state did not permit women to vote until after the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment 
in 1919, and racial qualifications for voting did not end until after the Civil War. WESLEY W. 
HORTON, THE CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION 18–19 (2d ed. 2012). 
38  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 427 (1856); see also LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED 
SCOTT: A LIFE ON SLAVERY’S FRONTIER 233–319 (2009). 
39  See generally Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952 (1996). 
Further, while my focus is on the United States, these premises have a transnational sweep, 
as illustrated by the 1966 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, declaring 
that “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
art. 14, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
40  See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 2 (2011). 
41  See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness 
in Numbers]. 
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But what forms of access ought to be subsidized, which asymmetries 
should be addressed, and what costs should be imposed on users? These 
questions about the need for resources (both individual and institutional) to 
pursue and to entertain claims are not new. In 1793, Jeremy Bentham inveighed 
against court fees, which he described as a “tax upon distress.”42 Yet, once all 
persons are egalitarian rights-holders, the problems become all the more 
acute—both for users and for court systems. Responses promoting access 
unfolded during the twentieth century and ranged from workers’ compensation 
programs and small claims courts to new constitutional doctrines, such as the 
guarantee in Gideon v. Wainwright for indigent defendants facing felony 
charges to have state-provided counsel,43 and the requirement in Boddie v. 
Connecticut that the state waive fees for indigent litigants seeking divorces.44 
Congress authorized the Legal Services Corporation to support poor civil 
litigants more generally, and many waves of procedural reforms eased access to 
courts and to information from opponents. 
IV. THE POLITICAL IMPORT AND THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC PROCESSES 
These brief forays into the development of the public and democratic 
functions of courts—and the new challenges that shift has produced—are in 
service of analyzing several facets of the contingency of courts, and hence of 
what Professor Subrin termed courts’ “values and goals.” A first point is about 
the relationship of courts to what political theorists call the “public sphere,” 
often defined as civic (rather than governmental) institutions that facilitate 
policy debates and the formation of civic cultures.45 
These spaces are cherished in democracies for enabling the “public” to 
understand its ability to affect government—or as Nancy Fraser explained, the 
“public(s),” because the diverse subgroups within democracies constitute 
multiple public sphere(s).46 Courts should be understood as falling in the public 
sphere category because, while government-supplied, courtrooms are venues 
where private and public sectors meet to argue—before an audience of 
                                                        
42  JEREMY BENTHAM, A Protest Against Law-Taxes: Showing the Peculiar Mischievousness 
of All Such Impositions as Add to the Expense of Appeal to Justice, in 2 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 573, 582 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
43  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
44  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
45  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN 
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., 1991); JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW 
AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1998). 
46  See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of 
Actually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109 (Craig Calhoun, 
ed., 1992). 
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strangers—about law’s obligations.47 More than that, courts are one sphere 
aspiring to cut across class and ethnicity to welcome all who seek to participate. 
A second point is that courts have come to serve purposes beyond those 
contemplated by Bentham. The social movements of the twentieth century 
reinvented courts as venues recognizing the equal rights of all persons and as 
sources of new understandings of what “equal” means. Courts operating under 
these conditions are not just sources of rights but also sites of democratic 
practices—places in which people learn about what democratic interactions 
require,48 or about the failure of courts to live up to those obligations.49 In 
courts, disputants are obliged to treat opponents civilly, and the state is 
compelled to accord women and men of all colors and classes equal respect and 
dignity. The public watches those exchanges, as it also learns that law is not 
fixed ex ante, but that norms develop in the interaction between fact and law 
and attitudes; what law itself is can be seen as contested terrain, produced 
through sequences of conflicts and their resolutions.50 Courts are places in 
which the sovereignty of the people matters, in which law becomes vivid, and 
through which norms are reaffirmed or undermined. 
Third, publicity has another, less appreciated, function as foundational to 
judicial independence, which in turn is also a predicate to the legitimacy of 
adjudication in democracies. I have already adverted to the history of judges 
acting as loyal servants of the state. The concept of ordinary judges enjoying an 
authority to sit in judgment of the very power that employs them dates back 
only a few centuries. In the United States, both state and federal constitutional 
commitments to judicial independence have helped to generate a culture that 
has come to assume—and therefore to protect—this attribute, even as judicial 
independence remains elusive in many parts of the world.51 
                                                        
47  See JOHN R. PARKINSON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC SPACE: THE PHYSICAL SITES OF 
DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2012). 
48  See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY 
AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 288–305 (2011). 
49  The new shorthand for these failings is “Ferguson,” as the March report from the U.S. 
Department of Justice charted the degree to which its court system was biased. See CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIV., supra note 10. Thereafter Missouri’s Supreme Court assigned an appellate 
justice to replace the local judge. See Order Transferring The Honorable Roy L. Richter, 
Eastern District, Missouri Court of Appeals, to the 21st Judicial Circuit (St. Louis County) 
(Mo. Mar. 9, 2015) (en banc). 
50  Deborah Hensler, paper presented at Northeastern University School of Law, Through a 
Glass Starkly: Civil Procedure Reconsidered, A Symposium Celebrating the Scholarship of 
Professor Steve Subrin (Apr. 11, 2014). 
51  Several international efforts seek to understand and to support the independence of 
judges. See generally THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2011); Bernd 
Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A 
Global Survey, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 159 (2014). 
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While the meaning of judicial independence is debated, a shared central 
premise is that judges are not to be controlled or corrupted by others,52 and 
therefore that their judgments merit attention and compliance. Publicity is one 
method of producing and policing independence. If judges are on display, the 
public can know whether judges bow to the state or to other powerful litigants. 
Further, the constitutional obligations of “open courts,” implemented through 
statutes creating and funding judiciaries, have made routine the disclosure of 
judges’ salaries and court budgets as well as data on filings, trends, case 
proceedings, and outcomes.53 Canons of ethics and statutes on disqualification 
elaborate standards of conduct, from permissible sources of outside income to 
constraints on participating in partisan activities.54 
Public processes thus shape judges’ understandings of their own 
obligations by placing judges in a structured, deliberate relationship not only 
with disputants but also with the body public. This performative facet of 
judging is reflected in the phrase “the appearance of justice.”55 In order to 
fulfill the mandate that justice both be and appear to be fair, justice has actually 
to “appear,” to be visible. The ambitions that democracies have for courts 
require that procedural systems be seen, accessible, and knowable—confirming 
Bentham’s insistence on publicity’s centrality in and to justice. 
Fourth, the practices of judging once made publicity a relatively unself-
conscious aspect of adjudication—built from a mix of customs, practices, and 
rights, such as jury trials and evidentiary obligations to permit in-person 
confrontation of adverse witnesses in criminal cases.56 When, in the 1980s, 
Supreme Court justices elaborated the law of public access to courts, they 
referenced this history as a natural artifact of trials, always “open to all who 
                                                        
52  Volumes of case law and commentary debate the contours and structural arrangements 
that produce and protect judicial independence. See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE 
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman 
eds., 2002); Judith Resnik, Interdependent Federal Judiciaries: Puzzling About Why & How 
to Value the Independence of Which Judges, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 28. 
53  What is available is far from all that is needed. Yet the idea of openness produces 
presumptions of how much more data ought to be generated. See Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Courting Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About Our Important Courts, DAEDALUS, 
Summer 2014, at 129. 
54  See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18 & 28 U.S.C.); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3 (2010). 
55  See generally JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE (1974). The American 
Bar Association’s model rules for judicial conduct commend judges to attend to how others 
perceive their actions. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2010) (urging 
judges to “avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional 
and personal lives”). 
56  See generally Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014). 
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care to observe.”57 The material instantiations were the buildings; courthouses 
became recognizable structures and icons of government. As localities sought 
to mark their own identities, they invested in courthouses to embody their 
authority, shape their communities, and attract commerce. 
The nexus of adjudication to economic development is exemplified by the 
placement of courthouses at the center of towns.58 In some of the oldest county 
courthouses, everyone entered the one-room building through the same door.59 
In others, courtrooms sat in multi-function municipal centers, often termed 
town halls. Localities competed as well to be named the “seat of justice” within 
a county, just as cities sought to be state capitals as a way to garner recognition 
and expand their commercial base.60 
Openness has also been routine for appellate courts. Several state 
constitutions directed their supreme courts to write or to publish opinions, to 
make them freely available, to let others publish them, and to explain reasons 
for dissent. For example, Kentucky’s 1792 Constitution imposed a “duty of 
each judge of the Supreme Court, present at the hearing of such cause, and 
differing from a majority of the court, to deliver his opinion in writing.”61 West 
Virginia instructed judges in its 1872 Constitution to “prepare a syllabus of the 
points adjudicated” in those cases with written opinions.62 Arizona, California, 
and Michigan insisted that opinions “shall be free for publication by any 
                                                        
57  See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980). Chief Justice 
Burger wrote the plurality opinion for the Court. The concurrence by Justice Brennan, joined 
by Justice Marshall, offers a parallel account. Id. at 594–98 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
58  For example, the city planners in Warren County sited the courthouse in the center of 
town, and only sold the other town lots after it was constructed. See Judith Resnik, 
Commentary, “Crack, Jury Chairs, Warren County Courthouse, Warrenton, Missouri,” 
DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 180. 
59  The Fulton County Courthouse, one of the oldest courthouses in the country, is one  
such example. The courthouse building consisted entirely of one courtroom, and a  
separate building to house the County Clerk was not constructed until more than  
forty years after the courthouse’s construction. See Fulton County Courthouse, N.Y.  
ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/documents 
/Courthouse_History-Fulton-County.pdf (last visited June 30, 2015). 
In contrast, courtroom space occupies less than 10 percent of the John Joseph Moakley 
United States Courthouse in Boston, which opened in 1998. See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION, JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE AND HARBORPARK, 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS 32 (2003); Douglas P. Woodlock, Dedication Ceremony of the 
John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse: Boston, Massachusetts, April 18, 2001, 17 
NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y 9, 9 (2001); Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally 
and Legally): The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 
823, 897–98 (2012) [hereinafter Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary]. 
60  See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 48, at 134–153. 
61  KY. CONST. of 1792, art. V, § 4. 
62  W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VIII, § 5. West Virginia’s current constitution is an amended 
version of its 1872 constitution, and includes the same requirement. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 4. 
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person.”63 Once again, such legal provisions helped to produce public spaces. 
Just as localities put courts at their towns’ center, states built complexes for 
their capitals and either included  grand courtrooms for their supreme courts in 
their (often domed) state capital building or erected separate imposing 
courthouses as part of a government complex.64 
The federal adjudicatory system was layered on top of the court systems 
provided by the states. The first Judiciary Act created thirteen federal districts 
and a barebones federal judicial staff, rendering them relatively inaccessible as 
contrasted with state courts. Before 1850, no building was called a federal 
courthouse; about forty lower-court federal judges were dispersed around the 
country. Federal judges either occupied rooms in federal buildings such as 
Custom Houses, rented spaces from states, or used commercial buildings; a 
                                                        
63  ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (“Provision shall be made by law for the speedy publication of 
the opinions of the supreme court, and they shall be free for publication by any person.”); 
CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. VI, § 12 (superseded by the California Constitution of 1879, which 
did not address the issue, but was later revised in 1966 to state that Supreme Court opinions 
“shall be available for publication by any person,” CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (1966) (“The 
Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such opinions of the Supreme Court 
and courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, and those opinions shall be 
available for publication by any person. Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal 
that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.”)); MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. 
IV, § 35 (“All laws and judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person.”). The 
same provision existed in Michigan’s 1850 Constitution, MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, 
§ 36, but not in Michigan’s initial 1835 constitution. The current Michigan Constitution also 
provides:  
Decisions of the supreme court, including all decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing 
and shall contain a concise statement of the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for 
each denial of leave to appeal. When a judge dissents in whole or in part he shall give in writing 
the reasons for his dissent.  
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
Maryland’s Constitution provides similarly that “[p]rovision shall be made by Law for 
publishing Reports of all causes, argued and determined in the Court of Appeals and in the 
intermediate courts of appeal, which the judges thereof, respectively, shall designate as 
proper for publication.” MD. CONST. art. IV, § 16. In addition, New Jersey’s 1844 
Constitution required judges to provide “reasons . . . in writing,” N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. 
VI, § 2, but neither New Jersey’s original 1776 constitution nor its current constitution, in 
place since 1947, contain a similar provision. 
64  The Indiana Statehouse in Indianapolis, constructed in 1888, and the Oklahoma State 
Capitol in Oklahoma City, completed in 1917, are examples of the decision to place a 
courtroom for the Supreme Court in the same building where the legislature meets. The 
Statehouse Story, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/idoa/2431.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2014); 
Oklahoma Capitol, OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc 
/entry.php?entry=OK080 (last visited June 30, 2015). Illustrative of the decision to build a 
separate impressive structure are Connecticut, which built a courthouse for its Supreme 
Court in 1910, Virtual Tour of the Connecticut Supreme Court, CONN. SUPREME CT.  
HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.jud.ct.gov/historicalsociety/tour.htm (last visited June 30, 2015),  
and Washington, which became a state in 1889 and which also opened an imposing  
courthouse for its Supreme Court in 1913, History of the Temple of Justice, WASH. ST.  
CAPITOL CAMPUS TEMPLE OF JUSTICE CENTENNIAL, http://www.templecentennial.wa.gov 
/index.cfm?fa=home.templeHistory (last visited May 27, 2015). 
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single federal trial judge, sitting in a state such as Maryland or Indiana, had 
little need for a courthouse of his own. 
Yet the dominant mode of procedure—trials—built the public into the 
process. The Judiciary Act of 1789 mandated that “oral testimony and 
examination of witnesses in open court . . . be the same in all the courts of the 
United States.”65 Juries had to be drawn from the venire in which criminal 
indictments were lodged, and the Sixth Amendment required a “speedy and 
public trial” for those facing criminal charges.66 
The growth in the number and docket of lower federal courts came after 
the Civil War, as the national economy expanded and Congress enacted new 
jurisdictional statutes and created the Department of Justice. Rising caseloads 
produced demands for more judgeships, for more courthouses, and for new 
procedures to unify federal practice nationwide.67 
V. ENABLING AND COMPLICATING ACCESSIBILITY: THE 1938  
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Professor Subrin has provided a history of the enactment of the 1934 Rules 
Enabling Act,68 authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate procedural rules 
applicable in federal courts across the country.69 The normative goals shaping 
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facilitated a reconceptualization of 
federal adjudication by welcoming into court a diverse array of persons who 
became rights-holders as the century unfolded. Scholars have chronicled the 
underpinnings of the 1938 Rules—with their functionalist, anti-formalist 
commitments to easing barriers to entry through trans-substantive, uniform, 
national provisions that expanded opportunities for information exchange, 
vested discretion in trial judges, and aimed for efficient decision-making 
focused on the merits of claims.70 
                                                        
65  Judiciary Act of 1789 § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88. 
66  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
67  Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary, supra note 59, at 826–27 figs.2 & 3. 
68  See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, 
How Equity Conquered Common Law]; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
69  See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mary P. Squiers & Stephen N. Subrin, The Role of Local Rules, 
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62. 
70  See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on 
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 
(2013); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 68; Judith Resnik, Failing 
Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 494–98, 502–15 (1986) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith]; Burbank, supra note 68, at 1131–1163. David Shapiro 
provided a caveat on identifying purposes of a diverse group; he also concluded that the 
goals included restructuring civil process, achieving more uniformity in federal practice, 
escaping “rigidities and technicalities” through flexibility, and embracing adversarialism in 
litigation but without a focus solely on trials. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look 
at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1972–1977 (1989). 
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Those rules intersected with waves of new statutory rights and with 
funding for dozens of construction projects that enlarged the federal courthouse 
footprint. Congress substantially increased the number of federal life-tenured 
judgeships and, during the second half of the twentieth century, chartered new 
kinds of auxiliary personnel—magistrate and bankruptcy judges working in 
federal courts and administrative judges deployed in agencies.71 
To return to the two facets of “open courts,” the 1938 Rules were door-
opening in facilitating case filings. Yet the Rules also created obstacles for the 
other aspect of “open courts”—the potential for third parties to observe directly 
the proceedings. Through fashioning new pretrial procedures, the Federal Rules 
enabled the development of a litigation system in which trials became rare and 
key exchanges took place outside the courtroom.72 “Trial lawyers” came to be 
replaced by “litigators,” focused on pretrial motions and discovery, and by 
“problem-solving lawyers,” aiming for resolutions without trials. Judges 
became managers of both cases and lawyers.73 Over the decades, civil trial rates 
and the absolute number of trials declined—prompting judges to record their 
concerns that the phrase “trial judge” was becoming anachronistic.74 In 2012, 
fewer than 1.2 percent of cases reached trial.75 
Yet the 1938 Rules also provided new routes for information about claims 
to reach the public. The litigations that the Rules helped to spawn generated a 
wealth of public information. Until 2000, Rule 5 provided that discovery was to 
be filed with courts,76 and common law practices (with their constitutional 
overtones) made materials filed in court presumptively available for public 
                                                        
71  28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157–158, 631–636 (2012). See generally Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam 
Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for 
the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 (2002). 
72  See Stephen C. Yeazell, Essay, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil 
Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631 (1994); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial 
in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012). 
73  See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, 
Managerial Judges]. 
74  Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture: So Why Do 
We Still Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. Rev. 1405 (2002); William G. Young, An 
Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FEDERAL LAWYER, July 2003, at 30; see also Jordan M. 
Singer and William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at Federal District 
Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565 (2014). 
75  Table C-4: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action 
Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2012, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/10298/ (last visited May 29, 2015); see also Marc Galanter & 
Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without a Cat: The Continuing Decline & Displacement of 
Trials in American Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 115. 
76  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) had provided that discovery materials were to be 
filed “within a reasonable time.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d), 308 U.S. 645, 669 (1939) 
(submitted in 1937 to be effective in 1938). 
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review.77 The opportunities to obtain documents from opponents (including 
governments and commercial enterprises) turned discovery into what my 
colleague Owen Fiss termed the “poor person’s FBI.”78 Revisions in the 1960s 
opened doors to class actions, and a federal statute enacted in 1968 authorized 
coordination across districts in large-scale litigations. As another renowned 
proceduralist—Professor Benjamin Kaplan—commented at the 1988 
commemoration of fifty years of the Federal Rules, the Rules “have worked to 
considerable (if not universal) satisfaction to support revolutions of the 
substantive law. The much criticized discovery function and class action 
remain together the scourge of corporate and governmental malefactors.”79 
Kaplan’s description of the Rules as “much criticized” reflects the role 
courts play in the public sphere. Rights to public courts and rights in public 
courts generated conflicts about what obligations law ought to impose and the 
scope of the remedies. Vivid examples include mass litigation against injuries 
from cigarettes, asbestos, and pharmaceuticals, as well as individual cases 
focused on violence inside households.80 The many public disclosures 
prompted debates on what ought to constitute cognizable harms, who ought to 
be seen as deserving of what remedies, whether aggregation through class 
actions helped pool claimants or inappropriately altered defendants’ incentives, 
and what forms of relief ought to be available. Politically-charged exchanges 
ensued about litigation, lawyers, and rights, as the platforms of national parties 
advocated for or against curbing access to courts—often argued in terms of 
costs, delays, and claims about whether litigation undercut economic growth 
and imposed unduly high needs for insurance or enabled wrongdoers to be 
brought to justice.81 
Those conflicts, coupled with the cost of lawyers during decades when the 
demand for federal adjudication appeared unending,82 put pressures on the 
                                                        
77  See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1802–05 (2014) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Privatization of Process]. 
78  Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of 
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173 (2003). 
79  Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1881 (1989). He added that 
“fundamental faults of litigation procedure—for example, the handicapping of the weak, 
despite statutory help for them here and there—should be attributed not to the Rules, but 
rather to the state of the nation.” Id. 
80  One example, related to asbestos, comes from the information about the “Sumner 
Simpson papers,” demonstrating that executives in asbestos manufacturing companies were 
aware in the 1930s–1950s of the dangers of asbestos but did not inform workers of those 
risks. A deposition of a company executive’s son and efforts to prevent the disclosure 
brought the information to light. See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 
1366, 1372–74 (3d Cir. 1991). 
81  See Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and 
the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752 (2013). 
82  See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS  
18 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2826/. Some aspects of this report  
have been superseded by JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE  
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procedures the Federal Rules provided. Various sectors, with different agendas, 
argued for revisions. Celebrants of adjudication wanted to protect it and sought 
alternatives to divert some disputes to different venues. Some critics hoped for 
a friendlier “alternative” that would be less adversarial and more generative.83 
Others promoted ADR from a perspective critical of adjudication, seen by 
corporate and government sectors as a drag on innovation and intrusive on 
decision-making.84 These various strands produced a national movement 
seeking changes in rules, statutes, law school courses, and legal practice. A 
sequence of revisions of the Federal Rules (in what Thomas Main and Stephen 
Subrin have termed a “fourth wave” of procedural reform85) have now 
combined to limit the opportunities members of the public have to watch the 
interactions between judges and disputants in courthouses. 
A central example in the federal system is the evolution of Rule 16, 
governing pretrial activities. The Rule, coupled with statutes and local 
practices, has redirected judges away from public adjudication and towards 
becoming case managers promoting settlement.86 When first drafted as part of 
the 1938 Federal Rules, the possibility of a “pre-trial” meeting between judges 
and lawyers was innovative.87 As I have detailed elsewhere, the initial 
conception was not to put judges in the business of pressing for settlement but 
to help focus the disputants on what would be needed, if the case were to 
proceed to trial.88 However, the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 reflect the 
success of promoters of managerial judging, who changed the mandate for 
judges by tasking them with taking control of lawyers and cases, so as to 
structure the process and encourage the parties to settle their differences rather 
than litigate. 
In the 1983 amendments, “pre-trial” lost its hyphen, which had served to 
signal its function as a predicate to a trial; the noun “pretrial” became an event 
unto itself. The 1983 revision detailed what judges could do during pretrial, 
                                                                                                                                
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2748/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/5NBF-SG9C?type=pdf; see also Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra 
note 77, at 1799 figs.1 & 2, 1821–23. 
83  See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995). 
84  The terrain is mapped in Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 165 (2003). 
85  Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). 
86  See Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 77, at 1803–06; Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, supra note 73, at 399–402. See generally Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 70. 
87  State court judges sometimes held what were then termed “pre-trial” conferences, and 
those became models for the 1938 rules. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 
384–85 nn.50–51. 
88  Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384–86; Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, 
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 
935–37 (2000). 
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including proposing that litigants use what the rule termed “extrajudicial” 
efforts—various forms of ADR.89 
By 1993, what the Federal Rule drafters had situated a decade earlier as 
“extrajudicial” was reconceived to be internal to the judicial role; pretrial 
conferences became occasions for judges themselves to “consider and take 
appropriate action” on a host of activities, from “settling the case and using 
special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute” through forms of ADR90 to 
“disposing of pending motions” and organizing the presentation of evidence.91 
This pro-settlement stance is featured in materials the federal judiciary provides 
to the public. The judiciary’s website, adorned with an eagle at its top, offers 
help in “Understanding the Federal Courts” by explaining how the Federal 
courts work. In 2015, the text chosen to be set off in a separate box stated: “To 
avoid the expense and delay of having a trial, judges encourage the litigants to 
try to reach an agreement resolving their dispute.”92 
Local rules provide additional directions to put settlement at the 
forefront.93 For example, the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts (where 
Northeastern University Law School hosted the symposium in honor of 
Professor Subrin) directs that, at “every conference conducted under these 
rules, the judicial officer shall inquire as to the utility of the parties conducting 
settlement negotiations.”94 
Clarity on six points is required before turning to an analysis of the 
relationship between these new ADR procedures, publicity, and adjudication in 
democracies. First, under the umbrella of ADR come various procedures, some 
focused on conciliation, either by way of bilateral negotiations or with the 
assistance of third parties, including judges, mediators, or other “neutrals.” 
Some of the programs entail structured exchanges, such as “mini-trials” in 
                                                        
89  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2) (providing that “[a]t any pretrial conference, the court may 
consider and take appropriate action on the following matters,” including “settling the case 
and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or 
local rule”). 
90  Id. R. 16(c)(2)(I). 
91  Id. R. 16(c)(K), (N). 
92  Civil Cases, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases 
/civil-cases (last visited May 29, 2015). 
93  Rulemaking at the local level is also a topic Professor Subrin has analyzed. See Stephen 
N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and 
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989); Coquillette, Squiers & 
Subrin, supra note 69. 
94  See D. MASS. CIV. R. 16.4, available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/general/pdf 
/combined01.pdf (“(a) The judicial officer shall encourage the resolution of disputes by 
settlement or other alternative dispute resolution programs. (b) Settlement. At every 
conference conducted under these rules, the judicial officer shall inquire as to the utility of 
the parties conducting settlement negotiations, explore means of facilitating those 
negotiations, and offer whatever assistance may be appropriate in the circumstances. 
Assistance may include a reference of the case to another judicial officer for settlement 
purposes. Whenever a settlement conference is held, a representative of each party who has 
settlement authority shall attend or be available by telephone.”). 
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which each side is present and advocates present summaries of the arguments 
to help the principals understand the strengths and weaknesses of their and their 
adversary’s positions. Another alternative, styled “court-annexed arbitration,” 
occurs after cases are filed; courts invite a third party (generally chosen from a 
panel of pre-selected lawyers) to decide an outcome.95 This type of arbitration 
is to be distinguished from a contractual agreement not to use courts, as well as 
from recent interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act under which courts 
enforce clauses in documents governing the purchase of consumer goods and 
job applications mandating the use of private providers in lieu of courts.96 
Second, the use of all kinds of ADR could be voluntary or mandatory, and 
court rules range from mentioning the options to requiring their use.97 For 
example, in the federal system, judges can insist that disputants attend 
settlement discussions but cannot require disputants to settle.98 Similarly, some 
states have rules requiring disputants in certain kinds of cases (such as those 
involving family dissolution) to mediate as a predicate to adjudication, 
available only if mediation does not resolve the issues. In some jurisdictions, 
court-annexed arbitration is optional, and in others, required. 
The third issue is the impact of whatever resolutions are reached. If parties 
agree to end their disputes by settling them, those agreements preclude 
returning to court. But the use of mediation or arbitration may be “non-
binding”—even when mandated—and hence not preclusive of a trial or 
additional litigation thereafter. 
Fourth, to seek resolutions through court-encouraged settlements and other 
forms of ADR does not, intrinsically, require private processes. Criminal law is 
also replete with ADR, called in that context “plea bargaining” and “diversion.” 
                                                        
95  In a few jurisdictions, arbitrations are functionally short-form trials, in which thousands of 
cases are sent to panels of lawyer-arbitrators, operating under rules incorporating many of 
the state’s civil rules while shaping a presumptively brief (a few hours) hearing. As Illinois’s 
Uniform Arbitrator Reference Manual explains, the state mandated arbitration  
“for some types of civil disputes” to help reduce “court congestion, costs, and delay. . . .  
The goal of the process . . . is to deliver a high quality, low cost, expeditious  
hearing in eligible cases, resulting in an award that will enable, but not mandate,  
parties to resolve their dispute without a formal trial.” ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
COORDINATING COMM. OF THE ILL. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY  
ARBITRATION PROGRAM: UNIFORM ARBITRATOR REFERENCE MANUAL 2 (2010), available  
at http://www.dupageco.org/courts/33051/, archived at http://perma.cc/4BRF-UAAJ 
[hereinafter ILLINOIS UNIFORM ARBITRATOR REFERENCE MANUAL]. 
96  The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act is the subject of much 
discussion. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 41, at 118–54; Resnik, Diffusing 
Disputes, supra note 7, at 2874–93. 
97  A helpful overview of the procedures used across the country is provided by DONNA 
STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL REPORT 
(2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/adr2011.pdf/$file/adr2011.pdf. 
Additional research for another report is underway. See Dispute Resolution in Federal 
Courts: New Study to Look at How It’s Working, U.S. CTS. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.us 
courts.gov/news/2014/01/23/dispute-resolution-federal-courts-new-study-look-how-its-working. 
98  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f). 
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Yet aspects of these processes are mandatorily brought before the public. Pre-
trial hearings and plea bargains are both “on the record,” exemplifying that 
trials are not the only procedural format providing rights of audience. On the 
civil side, judges can convene conferences (whether in person or via 
teleconferencing) in open court where strangers can walk in, or judges can 
locate such exchanges in chambers to which the public has no access.99 
Similarly, court-annexed arbitrations could be held in courtrooms, other public 
venues, or not. 
Fifth is the question of costs. ADR procedures may be offered as part of 
the packet of state-paid and state-subsidized services when cases are filed, or 
ADR may be separately priced. Staffing may come from full-time court 
employees (judges included), or from third parties who either volunteer or are 
paid by the court or by disputants. For example, the policymaking body for the 
federal courts provided in 1999 that local rules should address the 
compensation of court-appointed “neutrals” and whether they would serve “pro 
bono or for a fee.”100 The related commentary called for participants “unable to 
afford the cost of ADR [to be] excused from paying.”101 Pursuant to this 
mandate, for example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has specified that 
the hourly fees were to be paid by funds from the federal judiciary.102 
Sixth, given the array of processes and the combinations among the 
different facets outlined above, a positive accounting of all the variations is 
difficult. My focus here is on the relationship of the public to court-based ADR 
in terms of whether the processes are, in practice, open for strangers to attend 
and the outcomes made available through publication or otherwise. My 
question is whether constitutional obligations of access to courts ought to be 
                                                        
99  See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 
849, 858–59 (2013). 
100  See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
53 (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2130/ [hereinafter SEPT. 1999 
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS]. The statute authorized the Conference to regulate 
compensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 658 (2012). The “non-mandatory principles” included 
making known rates and limits of compensation and requiring fee disclosures. Thanks to 
Donna Stienstra for pointing us to these sources. See also Jason Bertoldi, Compensating 
ADR Neutrals in the Federal Courts (Feb. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
101  SEPT. 1999 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 100, at 53–54. 
102  E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(2) (calling for compensation of $150 per hour for single 
arbitrators). In the Eastern District of New York, local rules provide compensation, to “be 
paid by or pursuant to the order of the Court subject to the limits set by the Judicial 
Conference” of “$250 for services in each case,” unless protracted, and if three arbitrators 
are used, the compensation is “$100 for service” for each. E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.7(b); 
see also D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. 201.1(c) (calling for compensation of “$250 for service in 
each case” unless the proceeding is protracted); M.D. GA. LOCAL R. 16.2.2(C) (providing 
that “arbitrators shall be compensated for their services in such amounts and in such manner 
as the Chief Judge shall specify from time to time by standing order”); N.D. CAL. ADR 
LOCAL R. 4-3(b) (calling for compensation of $250 per day for single arbitrators and $150 
per day for each member of a panel of three). 
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read to govern the alternatives to adjudication that judges promote and 
superintend. 
VI. FINDING THE PUBLIC IN COURT-BASED ADR 
Debate exists about how much ADR is used in courts, as well as what 
metrics to use to assess its impact. Yet, on two measures—the volume of 
rulemaking and the privatization of court-based interactions—the results are 
unambiguous: courts have promulgated hundreds of rules governing various 
forms of ADR, and those rules do not protect rights of the public to observe the 
processes or to know much about the results. 
Locating rules addressing court-based ADR required reviews of statutes, 
national and local rules, doctrine, manuals, overviews, ad hoc databases, and 
interviews with court staff.103 Despite a good deal of overlap, in part shaped by 
model rules,104 specifying the current state of public access to court-based ADR 
is difficult because rules regulating ADR generally do not take that issue as a 
category of analysis. To the extent that third parties are referenced, the context 
is usually an admonition that confidentiality is required of participants in ADR 
processes. 
Given my discussion of the evolution of Federal Rule 16 governing 
“pretrial” procedures in the federal courts, a first example comes from that 
Rule. Court-convened conferences with judges could be on the record in open 
court, just as in criminal proceedings, “pleas, sentencing, case conferences, and 
adjournments” are generally held in courtrooms.105 But the federal civil rules 
                                                        
103  Once again, acknowledgement of tireless work by the students cited above is in order, as 
they combed a host of sources and called many courts in the quest for this information. 
104  See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT STANDING COMM. ON ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ADR 
GUIDEBOOK (2003); STIENSTRA, supra note 97, app. 2 (Court Admin. & Case Mgmt. Comm. 
of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Attributes of a Well-Functioning Court ADR Program 
and Ethical Principles for ADR Neutrals (1997)); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000),  
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration_final_00.pdf; 
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2003), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs 
/mediation/uma_final_03.pdf; see also Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil Actions, 
LEXISNEXIS, May 2013, http://advance.lexis.com (search for “ ‘Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Civil Actions’ ”; then filter to “Secondary Materials”; then view entry titled 
“Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil Actions (May 2013)”). 
105  Simonson, supra note 56, at 2175; see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 
478 U.S. 1 (1986); El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean Int’l News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 
508 U.S. 147 (1993). Simonson argued that the U.S. Constitution obliges judiciaries to keep 
all non-trial criminal adjudication open and that, given the decline of jury trials, this right is 
sometimes under-enforced. Simonson, supra note 56, at 2177–79; 2206–21. Her examples 
included the routine closing of arraignments and misdemeanor courtrooms in certain 
localities and ad hoc exclusions, sometimes based on limited space for observers. Id. at 
2191–93. Further, she argued that an “audience of locals” was particularly important in that 
defendants are disproportionately from minority communities, under-represented in the 
professional participants in courtrooms. Id. at 2202–05. 
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do not specify that pretrial meetings be open to the public or on the record.106 
Indeed, the literature on mediation and settlement generally identifies private 
exchanges as central to facilitated agreements; privacy is seen as useful to 
induce uninhibited discussions, freed from concerns that concessions proposed 
or explored will later be used as evidence at trial or otherwise. 
Yet the rationales supporting privacy when negotiating do not readily apply 
either to outcomes or to court-annexed arbitration, in which a third party 
renders a decision based on presentations by the disputants. That process is 
available in state and in federal courts. In 1988, for example, in the “Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act,”107 Congress selected ten district 
courts that could mandate court-annexed arbitration for a limited set of cases 
involving monetary damages under $100,000; in addition, the statute permitted 
judges to refer to arbitration cases involving civil rights and constitutional 
claims—if the parties consented and if the issues were not novel.108 
The 1988 statute regulated the use of arbitration by including provisions 
governing the appointment of arbitrators, their certification, and their 
obligations. Arbitrators, described by 1998 as “performing quasi-judicial 
functions,”109 were subject to the rules of disqualification that applied to federal 
judges.110 Congress also specified the possibility of trial de novo, with 
assessment of fees for arbitration if the outcome at trial was less favorable than 
had been achieved in arbitration.111 
The 1988 provisions neither addressed the role of the public at such 
proceedings nor spoke in general about confidentiality but did provide that 
awards were not to be “made known” to judges assigned to the cases, so as to 
insulate them if litigation resumed.112 Further, the information adduced during 
                                                        
106  Conferencing by telephone is mentioned as an option for scheduling conferences. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(B). 
107  Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 901, 102 Stat. 
4642, 4659 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2012)). 
108  Id. Note that the 1998 revision, discussed infra notes 114–20 and accompanying text, 
does not include the limitation precluding cases that include novel issues. In the 1998 
Amendment, as well as the original 1988 statute, if the court’s jurisdiction rested on 28 
U.S.C. § 1343, which is available for cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arbitration is not 
permitted. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 6, 112 Stat. 
2993, 2995 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 654(a)(3) (2012)). 
109  Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 7, 112 Stat. at 2996 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 655(c) (2012)). 
110  Also provided was authority for courts to compensate them. Judicial Improvements and 
Access to Justice Act, § 901(a), 102 Stat. at 4662 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 656–
657 (2012)). 
111  In the 1988 provisions, Congress had provided that if a party did less well in the de novo 
trial, fee-shifting was permissible. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 
§ 901(a), 102 Stat. at 4661. That provision is not replicated in the 1998 statute. 
112  Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, § 901(a), 102 Stat. at 4661 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 657(b) (2012) (“Sealing of Arbitration Award”)). 
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arbitration and the awards made were not to be admitted as evidence if a trial 
took place subsequent to the arbitration.113 
A decade later, the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998”114 
required that all federal district courts “shall authorize, by local rule . . . , the 
use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions,” including the 
“use of arbitration.”115 Those provisions altered somewhat the category of cases 
for which arbitration was permissible.116 Further, Congress specified court 
authority to appoint additional personnel (“neutrals”117 and “arbitrators”118) as 
staff and called on the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) and the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts to “assist the district courts in the establishment and 
improvement” of programs.119 
Congress also required district courts to protect the “confidentiality of 
alternative dispute resolution processes” through prohibitions on “disclosure of 
confidential dispute resolution communications.”120 The statute could be read 
to suggest, but does not speak directly to, the question of whether arbitration 
proceedings themselves constituted “confidential dispute resolution 
communications,” and little reported case law addresses the issue.121 
                                                        
113   Id. § 901(a), 102 Stat. at 4660 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 657(c)(3) (2012) 
(“Limitation on Admission of Evidence”)). This constraint adds arbitration proceedings to 
the limits imposed by federal evidentiary rules which have, since 1975, precluded admission 
of information obtained in a mediation or settlement conference. See FED. R. EVID. 408. 
114  Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2012)). 
115  28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012). The statute explained that its provisions were not to affect 
existing programs under the 1988 statute. See id. § 654(d). This provision means that 
districts that had the authority, under the 1988 act, to mandate arbitration for eligible cases, 
could continue to do so. 
116  See id. § 654(a) (authorizing referrals of “any civil action (including any adversary 
proceeding in bankruptcy) pending before it when the parties consent, except . . . [actions] 
based on an alleged violation of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States [or 
when] jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on section 1343 of this title,” or when the 
relief sought in monetary damages exceeds $150,000). 
117  Id. § 653. 
118  Id. § 655. 
119  Id. § 651(f). 
120  Id. § 652(d) (“Confidentiality Provisions”). Congress called on districts to adopt local 
rules implementing confidentiality and in the interim provided this provision. See infra notes 
128–30 for discussion of some federal court local rules on arbitration and on confidentiality 
more generally. 
121  One 2007 lower court decision referenced the statute as if it was a congressional mandate 
that court-annexed arbitrations be confidential. In Stepp v. NCR Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 826, 
836–37 (S.D. Ohio 2007), an employee who had lost a job and alleged age discrimination, 
and the employer sought confidential compulsory arbitration outside of the courts. The 
district court rejected the claim that closure failed to vindicate his statutory rights by citing 
not only the case law on the Federal Arbitration Act but also 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1948), 
which the court read as providing “confidentiality in court mandated arbitration.” Id. at 837 
(citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)). 
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Forays into rules promulgated at the district court level were therefore in 
order. As noted, Congress in 1988 permitted ten districts to create mandatory 
court-annexed arbitration programs.122 Thus, one way to learn about whether 
rules carved out places for the public in ADR was to review the 2014 local 
rules in the ten district courts that have had statutory authority to provide court-
annexed arbitration for about twenty-five years. 
Having such authority does not necessarily translate into using it. As of the 
spring of 2015, four of the original ten district courts licensed to mandate court-
annexed arbitration had rules providing for it, and three districts continued their 
mandatory arbitration programs.123 Another of the original ten districts—the 
Western District of Michigan—had repealed its obligations to arbitrate, and 
explained its decision with the comment that the “Court’s experience with 
alternative means of dispute resolution in this district shows that attorneys and 
clients rarely resort to court-annexed arbitration, as they prefer other methods 
of dispute resolution, especially voluntary facilitative mediation.”124 Four of the 
remaining five districts had no rules directing mandatory court-annexed 
arbitration,125 and in the one that did, staff indicated in interviews that no 
arbitrations had been held in the last two years.126 
                                                        
122  As noted, in its 1998 amendments, Congress specified that the revisions did not “affect 
any program in which arbitration is conducted pursuant to [the 1988 statute].” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 654(d)(2012). 
123  See D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. 201.1(d)(1) (“Subject to the exceptions set forth in [the local 
rules], the Clerk shall designate and process for compulsory arbitration any civil action 
pending before the Court where the relief sought consists only of money damages not in 
excess of $150,000 exclusive of interest and costs and any claim for punitive damages.”); 
E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.7(d)(1) (requiring that the Clerk of the Court “designate and 
process for compulsory arbitration all civil cases . . . wherein money damages only are being 
sought in an amount not in excess of $150,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs.”); E.D. PA. 
LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(3)(a) (explaining that the Clerk shall “designate and process for 
compulsory arbitration all civil cases (including adversary proceedings in bankruptcy, 
excluding, however, (1) social security cases, (2) cases in which a prisoner is a party, (3) 
cases alleging a violation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution, and (4) actions in 
which jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. §1343) wherein money damages 
only are being sought in an amount not in excess of $150,000.00 exclusive of interest and 
costs”). The fourth district, the Northern District of California, continued to have a rule 
related to arbitration but had not used that provision for some time. See N.D. CAL. ADR 
LOCAL R. 3-2 (“Litigants in certain cases designated when the complaint or notice of 
removal is filed are presumptively required to participate in one non-binding ADR process 
offered by the Court (Arbitration, Early Neutral Evaluation, or Mediation) or, with the 
assigned Judge’s permission, may substitute an ADR process offered by a private 
provider.”); Telephone Interview with Donna Stienstra, Senior Researcher, Fed. Judicial Ctr. 
(June, 2015). 
124  See Paul L. Maloney, Chief Judge, W.D. Mich., Administrative Order Re: Proposed 
Amendments to Local Civil Rule 16 to Eliminate Court-Annexed Arbitration, Admin. Order 
No. 12-028 (March 8, 2012) (“After consulting with this Court’s Standing . . . Advisory 
Committee, the Court has concluded that court-annexed arbitration should no longer be 
offered as a method of alternative dispute resolution in this district.”). 
125  See M.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 8.02(a) (“Any civil action may be referred to arbitration in 
accordance with this rule if the parties consent in writing to arbitration [with exceptions].”); 
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In addition to focusing on how the ten, 1988-authorized districts were 
dealing with court-annexed arbitration, these courts also offer a window into 
rules about the public’s role in other kinds of ADR. In general, the rules of 
these districts protect confidentiality. To the extent the public comes into view, 
it is as an entity to be avoided. The texts varied: some spoke about the 
confidentiality of ADR per se, and others directly mentioned specific kinds of 
ADR. Three districts provided that any alternative dispute resolution 
proceeding be confidential, but did not specify which forms of ADR were 
encompassed within the rule.127 Four districts required that mediation and/or 
                                                                                                                                
W.D.N.C. L.Cv.R. 16.3(B)(1) (“If a mediated settlement conference is ordered, the conduct 
of the ADR proceeding shall be governed by the Rules Governing Mediated Settlement 
Conferences in Superior Court Civil Actions promulgated by the North Carolina Supreme 
Court pursuant to N. C. Gen. Stat. 7A-38 (the ‘Mediation Rules’), and by the supplemental 
rules set forth herein.” The statute these rules incorporate indicates that “[t]he senior resident 
superior court judge, at the request of and with the consent of the parties, may order the 
parties to attend and participate in any other settlement procedure authorized by rules of the 
Supreme Court or by the local superior court rules, in lieu of attending a mediated settlement 
conference. . . . Nothing in this section shall prohibit the parties from participating in, or the 
court from ordering, other dispute resolution procedures, including arbitration to the extent 
authorized under State or federal law.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(i)); W.D. OKLA. L.CV.R. 
16.1(c) (“The court authorizes Alternative Dispute Resolution methods, including mediation, 
judicial settlement conferences, and summary jury trials.”); W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV-88(c) 
(“The court may refer a case to ADR on the motion of a party, on the agreement of the 
parties, or on its own motion; however, the court may refer a case to arbitration only with the 
consent of the parties (including but not limited to their consent by contract to arbitration).”); 
General Order, Western District of Missouri Mediation and Assessment Program  
§ II.B. (2012), available at http://www.mow.uscourts.gov/district/map/MAPGeneralOrder_ 
2013-08-01.pdf [hereinafter MAP General Order, W.D. Mo.] (“If the parties are unable to 
agree, the Director in his or her discretion, after consultation with one or all the parties, may 
select some other form of ADR.”). 
126  Telephone Interview with Jill Morris, Mediation and Assessment Program Dir., W. Dist. 
Mo. (June 2015). 
127  The Western District of Michigan’s rule “Confidentiality” provides: “All ADR 
proceedings are considered to be compromise negotiations within the meaning of Fed. R. 
Evid. 408.” W.D. MICH. L.CIV.R. 16.2(d). The rules define ADR proceedings to include 
Voluntary Facilitative Mediation (L.CIV.R. 16.3); Early Neutral Evaluation (L.CIV.R. 16.4); 
Case Evaluation (L.CIV.R. 16.5); Summary Jury Trials, Summary Bench Trials (L.CIV.R. 
16.7); and Settlement Conferences (L.CIV.R. 16.8). In addition, the rule references “other 
ADR methods proposed by the parties.” W.D. MICH. L.CIV.R. 16.2(a). 
In the Western District of Missouri’s “General Order, Western District of Missouri 
Mediation and Assessment Program,” Part VIII addresses the confidentiality of ADR 
proceedings, and authorizes the mediator to “ask the parties and all persons attending the 
mediation to sign a confidentiality agreement.” MAP General Order, W.D. Mo., supra note 
125, § VIII.E (“Confidentiality Agreement”). Further, that rule provides:  
1. This Court shall treat as confidential all written and oral communications, not under oath, 
made in connection with or during any Program session except as otherwise noted in this 
Section. 
2. Any communication not under oath made in connection with any proceeding in this Program 
shall not be disclosed to anybody unrelated to the Program by the parties, their counsel, 
Mediators or any other participant in the Program and shall not be used for any purpose in 
any pending or future proceeding in this Court except by consent of the parties or as allowed 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence or this Section. Communications made in connection 
with any proceeding in this Program include the comments, assessments, evaluations or 
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early neutral evaluation be confidential but did not address court-annexed 
arbitration.128 Three districts had different rules for mediation and for 
arbitration and imposed mandates of confidentiality on mediation; in contrast, 
the arbitration rules focused on the inadmissibility of information at trial129—
                                                                                                                                
recommendations of the Mediator. Mediators shall not discuss any matter communicated to 
them during any Program proceeding except with the permission of the parties . . . . 
Id. § VIII.A. The rule also explains that discussions can take place between the program 
directors and others, including judges and evaluators. Id. § VIII.B. Further, “[a]ny 
information furnished under oath, whether by affidavit, testimony or otherwise, may be used 
for impeachment purposes in this Court or elsewhere. Nothing in this Order is intended to 
provide any protection from the criminal consequences of making a false statement under 
oath.” Id. § VIII.C. 
The Western District of Texas provides that ADR proceedings shall be confidential, but 
does not specify whether its rule applies to arbitration and mediation but states that the 
“court may approve any ADR method the parties suggest or the court believes is suited to the 
litigation.” See W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV-88(a). Rule CV-88(h) on “Confidentiality” 
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided herein, or as agreed by the participants, a 
communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by any 
participant during an alternative dispute resolution procedure, whether before or after the 
institution of formal judicial proceedings, is confidential, may not be disclosed, may not be 
used as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding, and 
does not constitute a waiver of any existing privileges or immunities.” Id. R. CV-88(h). 
Further, the rule provides that any “record made at an alternative dispute resolution 
procedure is confidential.” Id. R. CV-88(h)(1). However, “[a]n oral communication or 
written material used in or made a part of an alternative dispute resolution procedure is 
admissible or discoverable if it is admissible or discoverable independent of the procedure.” 
Id. R. CV-88(h)(2). Moreover, “[i]f this section conflicts with other legal requirements for 
disclosure of communications or materials, the issue of confidentiality may be presented to 
the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings to determine, in camera, whether the facts, 
circumstances, and context of the communications or materials sought to be disclosed 
warrant a protective order of the court or whether the communications or materials are 
subject to disclosure.” Id. R. CV-88(h)(3). 
128  See N.D. CAL. ADR LOCAL R. 5-12 (“Early Neutral Evaluation: Confidentiality”) (also 
permitting parties to stipulate to disclosures); Id. R. 6-12 (“Mediation: Confidentiality”) 
(again permitting stipulated disclosures by the parties; and also permitting mediators to “ask 
the parties and all persons attending the mediation to sign a confidentiality agreement on a 
form provided by the court” and in commentary noting that law sometimes permits 
disclosures, for example to protect against crimes or bodily harms); M.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 
9.07(b) (“Restrictions on the Use of Information Derived During the Mediation 
Conference”) (“All proceedings of the mediation conference, including statements made by 
any party, attorney, or other participant, are privileged in all respects. The proceedings may 
not be reported, recorded, placed into evidence, made known to the trial court or jury, or 
construed for any purpose as an admission against interest. A party is not bound by anything 
said or done at the conference, unless a settlement is reached.”); M.D.N.C. LOCAL R. 83.9e 
(“Procedures for Mediated Settlement Conferences”); W.D. OKLA. L.CV.R. 16.2(f) 
(providing for the confidentiality of judicial settlement conferences); id. R. 16.3(f) 
(providing for the confidentiality of court-ordered mediation). 
129  In the District of New Jersey, Appendix Q (“Guidelines for Mediation”) provides that: 
“Neither the parties nor the mediator may disclose any information presented during the 
mediation process without consent. The only exception to this rule of confidentiality is when 
disclosure may be necessary to advise the compliance judge of an apparent failure to 
participate in the mediation process.” D.N.J. LOCAL R. app. Q § II.B. In addition, the 
Appendix explains that “appropriate sanctions may be imposed on any party or attorney who 
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sometimes by referencing federal evidentiary rules that preclude admission of 
information related to settlement at trial and then specifying that information 
developed through court-annexed arbitration was likewise not to be admitted.130 
                                                                                                                                
fails to participate in a meaningful manner or to cooperate with the mediator or who 
breaches confidentiality.” Id. § III. In contrast, Appendix M (“Guidelines for Arbitration”) 
does not provide that arbitration shall be confidential. It does explain, however, that evidence 
produced during an arbitration proceeding may only be used in limited circumstances in a de 
novo trial: “[N]either the fact that the case was arbitrated nor the amount of the arbitrator’s 
award is admissible. However, testimony given upon the record of the arbitration hearing 
may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness at any subsequent trial de novo. In light 
of the limitation placed by the Court upon the use of exhibits at subsequent Court 
proceedings, the arbitrator should return all exhibits to counsel at the conclusion of the 
arbitration hearing.” D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. app. M § III. 
The rules for the Eastern District of New York address mediation as confidential and 
permit mediators to ask for confidentiality agreements absent a different agreement; court-
annexed arbitration is not discussed in terms of confidentiality but the evidence adduced is 
not admissible at a de novo trial. See E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.8 (“Court-Annexed 
Mediation”); id. R. 83.7 (“Court-Annexed Arbitration”). Moreover, the E.D.N.Y. rules 
provide for parties to record the proceeding. See id. R. 83.7(f)(6) (“A party may have a 
recording and transcript made of the arbitration hearing . . . .”). The rule does provide that, 
should there be a trial de novo, “the Court shall not admit evidence that there had been an 
arbitration proceeding, the nature or amount of the award, or any other matter concerning the 
conduct of the arbitration proceeding.” Id. 83.7(h)(3). 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania local civil rule 53.3(3) provides that “[a]ll ADR 
processes subject to this Rule shall be confidential, and disclosure by any person of 
confidential dispute resolution communications is prohibited unless confidentiality has been 
waived by all participants in the ADR process, or disclosure is ordered by the assigned judge 
for good cause shown.” E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.3(3). However, Rule 53.3(7) provides 
that “[n]othing in the Rule shall be construed to amend or modify the provisions of Local 
Civil Rule 53.2 (compulsory and voluntary arbitration with right of trial de novo).” Id. R. 
53.3(7). Rule 53.2, which governs arbitration, does not discuss confidentiality. Id. R. 53.2. 
130  Federal Rule of Evidence 408 (“Compromise Offers and Negotiations”) reflected a 
common law protection of negotiations, predicated on the ideas of the irrelevancy of 
discussion to findings of liability and of the desirability of encouraging negotiations. FED. R. 
EVID. 408. Protected are the conduct and statements made during compromise negotiations. 
Amendments in 2008 specify a somewhat different approach for criminal cases. See Id. R. 
408(a)(2) (indicating that “conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations 
about the claim—except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to 
a claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement 
authority”). Moreover, the rule provides that evidence can come in for “another purpose, 
such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or 
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” Id. R. 408(b). Whether 
in practice Rule 408 suffices and whether it should be more or less protective are questions. 
Three courts’ local rules incorporate the Federal Rules of Evidence when discussing 
arbitration proceedings. See N.D. CAL. ADR LOCAL R. 4-12(b) (“Limitation on Admission of 
Evidence. At the trial de novo the Court shall not admit any evidence indicating that there 
has been an arbitration proceeding, the nature or amount of any award, or any other matter 
concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding, unless: (1) The evidence would 
otherwise be admissible in the trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence, or (2) The parties 
have otherwise stipulated.”); W.D. MICH. L.CIV.R. 16.2(d) (“Confidentiality - All ADR 
proceedings are considered to be compromise negotiations within the meaning of Fed. R. 
Evid. 408.”); E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(7)(C) (“At the trial de novo, the court shall not 
admit evidence that there had been an arbitration trial, the nature or amount of the award, or 
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To expand the analysis, we undertook a broader search of local rules that 
included districts beyond the initial ten identified in the 1988 statute on court-
annexed arbitration. As noted, in 1998 revisions to the 1988 statute, Congress 
provided an expanded mandate for ADR, altered its requirements somewhat for 
court-annexed arbitration, and authorized its use in any district complying with 
the requirements.131 That review yielded about thirty districts in which, as of 
2014, rules could be read to permit court-annexed arbitration.132 Inquiries 
identified eight districts (including the three noted in the discussion of the 1988 
legislation, above) that had programs for court-annexed arbitration. Use varied 
widely, from districts in which hundreds of cases went through its program 
yearly to those in which no court-annexed arbitrations had been held.133 
                                                                                                                                
any other matter concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding unless the evidence 
would otherwise be admissible in the Court under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 
131  Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2012)). See 28 U.S.C. § 651 for authorization of dispute 
resolution processes. 
132  See Kelly, Milione & Porter, Memo, Court-Annexed Arbitration, supra note 13, at 2. 
This list of thirty was culled from tables provided through an FJC review of “local rules, 
general orders, CJRA plans, internal operating procedures, web sites, and any other written 
source” on a district’s ADR procedures. See STIENSTRA, supra note 97, at 3–4. 
The Stienstra review suggested that fifty districts could have some kind of arbitration 
program. We reduced the number to thirty by eliminating districts that reference arbitration 
but do not have programs, and conducted telephone interviews to confirm that court-annexed 
arbitration programs exist. Examples of districts with rules that we did not include in the 
thirty in which staff were contacted are E.D. CAL. LOCAL R. 271(a)(1) (“It is the Court’s 
intention [to] allow the participants to take advantage of a wide variety of alternative dispute 
resolution methods. These methods may include, but are not limited to, mediation, 
negotiation, early neutral evaluation, and settlement facilitation. The specific method or 
methods employed will be determined by the Neutral and the parties and may vary from 
matter to matter.”); S.D. CAL. CIV. R. 16.1(c)(2) (“If no settlement is reached at the [Early 
Neutral Evaluation] conference, the judicial officer may . . . [d]iscuss the parties’ willingness 
to agree to non-binding arbitration or mediation within forty-five (45) days (1) in any case 
where the judicial officer believes arbitration or mediation might result in a cost-effective 
resolution of the lawsuit, or (2) in any case where the parties have indicated an interest in 
arbitration or mediation.”); D. COLO. L.CIV.R. 16.6(a) (“A district judge or a magistrate 
judge exercising consent jurisdiction may direct the parties to engage in an early neutral 
evaluation or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding.”); D.S.D. LOCAL R. 53.1 
(“Alternative Dispute Resolution: Parties are encouraged to use alternative dispute resolution 
procedures to try to settle their cases without a trial. Magistrate judges are available as 
mediators to facilitate alternative dispute resolution procedures.”); N.D. GA. CIV. LOCAL R. 
16.7(B)(1) (“A judge may in his or her discretion refer any civil case to a non-binding ADR 
process, e.g. early neutral evaluation, mediation, or non-binding arbitration. Upon the 
consent of the parties, the judge may refer any civil case to binding arbitration, binding 
summary jury trial or bench trial, or other binding ADR process.” However, the rules also 
state that “[t]his program has not been funded by Congress and will not be implemented until 
funded.” R. 16.7(B)(2)). 
133  Interviews conducted in April of 2014 provide some insight into frequency of court-
annexed arbitrations. The District of New Jersey, Eastern District of New York, and the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania reported robust court-annexed arbitration programs: staff 
described such arbitrations as “not unusual” in the District of New Jersey, and noted that 
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Honing in on this set of eight, we sought to understand whether the public 
was permitted to attend court-annexed arbitrations or whether the general 
reference in the 1998 act to the confidentiality of ADR processes, coupled with 
other sources, has been read to preclude observers, including when arbitration 
hearings were held in courtrooms. A mix of reading rules and discussions with 
court staff yielded the conclusion that, as of 2014, court-annexed arbitrations 
were or would be private (if held) in five federal district courts,134 and open to 
the public in three,135 including in two districts reporting hundreds of court-
annexed arbitrations yearly.136  
                                                                                                                                
they took place about 180 times a year in the Eastern District of New York, and 784 times in 
2013 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
In contrast, staff in one district—the Western District of Missouri—described such 
proceedings as “rare” or “very rare,” or that none had taken place in the past year. In the 
District of Delaware, staff estimated similarly low frequency—5 or 6 times in the past 20 
years; staff in the District of Idaho reported about 5 court-annexed arbitrations in the past 10 
years. In the District of Connecticut, the program had operated from 1978 until about 1982, 
D. CONN. LOCAL R. 28 (not in use) (on file with author), and no court-annexed arbitrations 
had taken place for more than twenty years. Interview with Janet Hall, Chief Judge, D. Conn. 
(June 2015); Kelly, Milione & Porter, Memo, Court-Annexed Arbitration, supra note 13, at 
5–6. 
134  Two districts’ local rules—in the Western District of Missouri and the Western District 
of Pennsylvania—specified that sessions were private. See MAP General Order, W.D. Mo., 
supra note 125, § VIII.A (“This Court shall treat as confidential all written and oral 
communications, not under oath, made in connection with or during any Program session 
except as otherwise noted in this Section.”); W.D. PA., ADR POLICIES & PROCEDURES § 6(A) 
(“Except as provided in subsection D of this Section 6, this Court, the ADR Coordinator, all 
neutrals, all counsel, all parties and any other person who participates (in person or by 
telephone) in (i) any ADR process described in Sections 1 through 5 of these Policies and 
Procedures, or (ii) any private ADR process pursuant to Court order, shall treat as 
‘confidential information’ (i) the contents of all documents created for or by the neutral, (ii) 
all communications and conduct during the ADR process, and (iii) all ‘communications in 
connection with’ the ADR process.”). 
In three other districts—the Middle District of Georgia, District of Idaho, and Eastern 
District of New York—clerks informed students working on this project that sessions were 
private. See Telephone Interview by Mark Kelley with Holly McCarra, Arbitration Clerk, 
Middle Dist. of Ga. (Apr. 2014); Telephone Interview by Devon Porter with Susie Headlee, 
ADR/Pro Bono Coordinator, Dist. of Idaho (Apr. 14, 2014); Telephone Interview by Devon 
Porter with Rita Credle, Arbitration Clerk, E. Dist. of N.Y. (Apr. 24, 2014). As noted, the 
Northern District of California has not held arbitrations but staff commented that, were they 
to be held, they would be private. Interview by Chris Milione with Tim Smagacz, ADR 
Program Adm’r, N. Dist. of Cal. (Apr. 23, 2014). 
135  See Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Mary Pat Thynge, Chief Magistrate 
Judge, Dist. of Del. (Apr. 17, 2014); Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Jim 
Quinlan, Arbitration Clerk, Dist. of N.J. (Apr. 9, 2014); Telephone Interview by Chris 
Milione with Michael E. Kunz, Clerk of the Court, E. Dist. of Pa. (Apr. 11, 2014). The Clerk 
of the Court of the Eastern District also explained that requiring arbitration proceedings to 
take place in a courtroom, open to the public, was meant in part to lend dignity to the 
proceedings. Id. 
136  See STIENSTRA, supra note 97, at 15 tbl.7. Stienestra reported that 2,799 cases had been 
referred to arbitration in her review of forty-nine federal district courts in a year period 
ending June 30, 2011; the District of New Jersey recorded 1,668 court-annexed arbitrations 
and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania listed 826 court-annexed arbitrations. Id. at app. 5. 
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The decision about where to hold an arbitration may be influenced by the 
economics of programs for court-annexed arbitration. Unlike judges, resident in 
courthouses, court-annexed arbitrators are often practicing lawyers, who may 
be paid between $150 to $250 per arbitration. Convening the proceeding in that 
lawyer’s office can be time-saving for that arbitrator, even as it makes public 
access to the proceeding functionally implausible. 
In addition to looking at rules in particular jurisdictions, other routes into 
learning about whether the public has a place in ADR was through research on 
ADR and on model rules for ADR. In 2011, the Federal Judicial Center 
published an overview to provide an “initial report” on district court 
practices.137 That monograph detailed what kinds of programs federal district 
courts offered as ADR, how references to ADR were made, the neutrals 
deployed, and the funding for such proceedings. The report did not include 
discussion of where ADR procedures took place or of who could attend.138 
Another overview comes from an entity called Resolution Systems 
Institute (“RSI”), supported in part by the private ADR-provider JAMS (once 
the acronym for that group’s name—Judicial Arbitration and Mediation 
Services). RSI has created a database to provide a guide on state and federal 
rules and search tools for court-based ADR.139 Like the FJC’s 2011 overview, 
the RSI materials do not use “the public” or “access to ADR proceedings” as 
discrete topics of analysis. To locate rules addressing the participants in ADR, 
we searched the database using terms such as “attendance” and 
                                                        
137  STIENSTRA, supra note 97, at 4–15, app. 5. As noted, we used this monograph to identify 
the thirty jurisdictions that might provide court-annexed arbitration. See supra note 132. 
138  STIENSTRA, supra note 97, at 4–15, app. 5. 
139  See Court ADR Across the U.S., RESOL. SYS. INST. (2015), http://courtadr.org 
/court-adr-across-the-us/search.php, archived at http://perma.cc/MA84-ZYYM (last visited 
May 27, 2015). This guide offers a searchable database for both state and federal ADR 
resources, with separate inputs for Resource Type (such as “Academic Program,” “Advisory 
Opinion,” “Article,” and “Audiotape”), Case Type (such as “Administrative,” “Adult 
Guardianship,” “Aging - Elderly,” and “Agriculture”), Process Type (such as “Arbitration,” 
“Case Evaluation,” “Case Management,” and “Collaborative Law”), and Topics Covered 
(such as “Access to Justice,” “ADR Orientation,” “Advanced Degree Program,” and 
“Advocacy”), as well as inputs for Scope (State or Federal) and Court Type (Trial, 
Appellate, Supreme) and a scroll-box for State. The database itself does not provide a list of 
which federal court rules are included. By scrolling down on the search page and searching 
for “Federal” scope while leaving all other categories unmarked, the database referenced 
eighty-nine federal districts. Included were the districts in all of the states (except the 
Western District of Oklahoma) and the D.C. district court; excluded were rules for Guam, 
Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Northern Mariana Islands. See id. Through discussions with 
RSI staff, we learned that its focus was on the states and hence federal district courts in 
states. The staff at RSI assembles the materials and then culls rules to limit its database to 
rules directly related to court ADR. Interview by Benjamin Woodring with Mary Novak, 
Dir., RSI Res. Ctr., (Sept. 17, 2014). 
The page on RSI’s history indicates it has received some support from the JAMS 
Foundation. History 2011–2012, RESOL. SYS. INST., http://www.aboutrsi.org/history 
.php?ID=13 (last visited May 27, 2015). 
1664 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1631  
“confidentiality,”140 and found many state rules about maintaining 
confidentiality, often referencing mediation.141 In addition, some rules required 
                                                        
140  For example, by searching Resource Type: “Rules - Court”; unmarked Case Type; 
Process Type: “Arbitration”; and Topics Covered: “Attendance”, we found forty-six 
mentions of attendance, of which twenty-six were from state courts (at the county or state 
level) and twenty were from federal courts. 
Reviewing the rules on arbitration for state courts, two of these states expressly limit 
non-party attendance at ADR. See N.D. R. CT. 8.8(d) (“The ADR processes are confidential 
and not open to the public.”); S.C. ADR R. 5(d) (“ADR conferences are private. Other 
persons may attend only with the permission of the parties, their attorneys and the 
mediator.”). 
Two provide confidentiality requirements generally for ADR. See ME. R. CIV. PROC. 
16B(k) (“A neutral who conducts an alternative dispute resolution conference pursuant to 
this rule, or an alternative dispute resolution process pursuant to subsection (b)(6), shall not, 
without the informed written consent of the parties, disclose the outcome or disclose any 
conduct, statements, or other information acquired at or in connection with the ADR 
conference.”); MO. 11TH CIR. CT. R. 38.6 (“The proceedings [ADR] shall be private, 
confidential, and regarded as settlement negotiations as provided in Supreme Court Rules 
17.05 and 17.06. No stenographic, electronic or other record of an A.D.R. process shall be 
made.”). 
One state provides a confidentiality provision explicitly for arbitration. See GA. SUP. 
CT. ADR R. VII.A (“Unless a court’s ADR rules provide otherwise, the confidentiality 
herein applies to non-binding arbitration conferences as well. A written and executed 
agreement or memorandum of agreement resulting from a court-annexed or court-referred 
ADR process is not subject to the confidentiality described above.”). 
Three jurisdictions focus on the inadmissibility, in subsequent proceedings, of certain 
information gained from arbitration. See CAL. STANISLAUS CNTY. SUPER. CT. R. 3.06 (citing 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5, which states, “no arbitrator or mediator, shall be competent to 
testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, 
occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceeding”); N.D. R. CT. 8.8(d) (“When 
persons agree to conduct and participate in ADR processes for the purpose of compromising, 
settling, or resolving a dispute, evidence of anything said or of any admission made in the 
course of the ADR processes is inadmissible as evidence and disclosure of confidential ADR 
communications is prohibited, except as authorized by the court and agreed to by the parties 
or as permitted under N.D.C.C. §§ 31-04-11 and 14-09.1-06.”); HAW. CIRCUIT CT. R. 12.2(f) 
(“Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing or it is otherwise authorized and approved by 
the adjudicating court pursuant to the Uniform Mediation Act or other law, the neutral, 
counsel, the parties, and other participants in any mediation [or arbitration, by implication of 
Rule 12.2(a)], shall not communicate with the civil court adjudicating the merits of the 
mediated matter (including the settlement or trial judge) about the substance of any position, 
offer, or other matter related to mediation, nor shall a court request or order disclosure of 
such information unless such disclosure is required to enforce a settlement agreement, 
adjudicate a dispute over mediator fees, or provide evidence in any attorney disciplinary 
proceeding, and then only to the extent required to accomplish such purpose. However, the 
neutral may disclose to a court whether the ADR process is concluded or terminated; who 
attended; and, if applicable, whether a settlement or resolution was reached with regard to 
some or all issues presented.”). 
Two jurisdictions require complaints against arbitrators to remain confidential until the 
complaint has been resolved. See CAL. S.F. CNTY. SUPER. CT. R. 4.1(E)(2)(e) (“All complaint 
procedures and complaint proceedings shall be kept confidential. No information or records 
regarding the receipt, investigation, or resolution of a complaint may be open to the public or 
disclosed outside the course of the complaint proceeding except as provided in Rule 
4.1E.2.(d)(5) above [“After the decision on a complaint, the Presiding Judge or his/her 
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that grievances filed against arbitrators be confidential, at least until decisions 
were made about them.142 
                                                                                                                                
designee may authorize public disclosure of the name of the ADR panel member against 
whom action has been taken, the action taken, and the general basis on which the action was 
taken.”] or as otherwise required by law.”); CAL. STANISLAUS CNTY. SUPER. CT. R. 3.14(I) 
(“Except as provided in paragraphs (C) [memorandum record of frivolous complaint] and 
(G) [complainant to be notified about receipt and disposition of complaint], all papers filed 
and proceedings conducted on a complaint against a mediator, arbitrator or neutral evaluator 
should be confidential until disciplinary action is ordered by the court.”). 
Two jurisdictions have other specifications. See CAL. CONTRA COSTA CNTY. SUPER. CT. 
R. 3.202(e) (allowing parties to select non-essential attendees, stating: “As long as all trial 
attorneys, parties, and other people needed to present the case and answer the arbitrator’s 
questions are included, the parties may choose who will attend arbitration”); D.C. SUPER. CT. 
R. CIV. ARB. IV(b) (requiring that the selection procedure for arbitrators remain open to the 
public, stating: “The parties may agree among themselves to select a particular arbitrator 
from a roster of eligible arbitrators provided by the Multi-Door Division. Otherwise, when a 
Judge assigns a case to arbitration an arbitrator shall be assigned pursuant to procedures 
designated by the Presiding Judge of the Civil Division. The Multi-Door Division shall make 
available to the public copies of the current assignment procedures.”). 
Many states provide specific confidentiality provisions for mediation or judicial 
settlement conferences. See, e.g., OHIO CUYAHOGA CNTY. COMMON PLEAS CT. LOCAL R. 
21.2(E)(9) (“The entire mediation process is confidential.”); WASH. PIERCE CNTY. SUPER. CT. 
LOCAL R. 16(c)(2)(C) (“Proceedings of the settlement conferences shall, in all respects, be 
privileged and not reported or recorded. Without disclosing any communications made at the 
settlement conference, the settlement conference Judicial Officer may advise the assigned 
judicial department in writing as to whether the use of further or alternative dispute 
resolution procedures, or the appointment of additional investigators or the development of 
additional evidence would be advisable prior to trial.”). 
Thirteen state court rules provide confidentiality provisions for mediation or judicial 
settlements but do not expressly address confidentiality and attendance of non-parties at 
arbitration. See CAL. SAN DIEGO CNTY. SUPER. CT. R. Div. II, Ch. 3; MO. 22D CIR. CT. R. 
38.10; N.M. 3D DIST. CT. LOCAL R. 3-704(B)(11); N.Y. WESTCHESTER CNTY. ADR R. 5; N.C. 
MECKLENBERG CNTY. FAM. ADR R. exhibit D; N.C. DIST. CT. 17B FAM. CT. DIV. 
SETTLEMENT R. 11.3; N.C. IREDELL CNTY. ADR R. 5(E); N.C. SUP. CT. FAM. SETTLEMENT R. 
4(D); N.C. SUPER. CT. MSC R. 4(F); OHIO CUYAHOGA CNTY. COMMON PLEAS CT. R. 21.2; 
OHIO LUCAS CNTY. COMMON PLEAS CT. R. 6.01(E); OHIO RICHLAND CNTY. COMMON PLEAS 
CT. R. 2.02; WASH. PIERCE CNTY. SUPER. CT. LOCAL R. 16(c). 
141  Many rules, for example, include a definition of “ADR” as including arbitration, 
mediation, mini-trials, and other procedures, but go on to describe only the specific rules and 
procedures that apply to mediation. 
142  Examples of provisions making grievances against either mediators or arbitrators 
confidential (up to a point when sanctions are imposed or other screenings) include N.D. R. 
CT. 8.9 (g)(6) (“Unless and until sanctions are imposed, all [materials arising out of a] 
complaint [against mediators] shall be confidential” unless waived); CAL. S.F. CNTY. SUPER. 
CT. R. 4.1(E)(2)(d)(5), (e) (“All complaint procedures and complaint proceedings shall be 
kept confidential. No information or records regarding the receipt, investigation, or 
resolution of a complaint may be open to the public or disclosed outside the course of the 
complaint proceeding” until after “the decision on a complaint, the Presiding Judge or 
his/her designee may authorize public disclosure of the name of the ADR panel member 
against whom action has been taken, the action taken, and the general basis on which the 
action was taken,” or “as otherwise required by law”); CAL. STANISLAUS CNTY. SUPER. CT. 
R. 3.14(I) (“[A]ll papers filed and proceedings conducted on a complaint against a mediator, 
arbitrator or neutral evaluator should be confidential until disciplinary action is ordered by 
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Another way to look for a public dimension of ADR is through the model 
acts on ADR promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”), whose 
impact is reflected in many of the rules described above. In 2000, the ULC 
replaced its 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act; the 2000 Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act has been enacted in seventeen states and the District of 
Columbia.143 The Uniform Mediation Act, completed in 2001 and amended in 
2003, has been adopted by eleven states and the District of Columbia.144 
The Prefatory Note for the Mediation Act explains that “a central thrust of 
the Act is to provide a privilege that assures confidentiality in legal 
                                                                                                                                
the court.”); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 App.: Code of Ethics Enforcement Procedure § IV.A 
(“Unless and until final sanctions are imposed, all files, records, and proceedings of the 
Board that relate to or arise out of any complaint shall be confidential [with limited 
exceptions].”); S.C. REG. FOR THE COMM. ON ADR V(D)(10)(a) (“Except as otherwise 
provided in the ADR Rules and these Regulations or ordered by the Supreme Court, all 
complaints, proceedings, records, information or orders relating to an allegation of 
misconduct shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to the public.”); see also GA. SUP. 
CT. ADR R. app. C, ch. 2 § III(A), (C) (providing that a “mere grievance” be kept 
confidential unless and until a complaint is “forwarded” to an Ethics Committee). 
The relevant federal statute provides that individuals “serving as arbitrators” under 
court-run programs have “the immunities and protections that the law accords to persons 
serving” that “quasi-judicial” function. See 28 U.S.C. § 655(c). Local federal rules reiterate 
the provisions. See, e.g., E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.7(c) (“Immunity of Arbitrators. 
Arbitrators shall be immune from liability or suit with respect to their conduct as such to the 
maximum extent permitted by applicable law.”); Id. R. 83.8(g) (applying immunity to 
mediators); N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. PRAC. 83.11-5(d)(6). Turning then to judicial discipline, 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–360, allegations against federal judges for misbehavior are not made 
public by the courts unless certain sanctions are imposed by the Judicial Conference. 28 
U.S.C.§ 355(b)(1) (requiring House of Representatives and Clerk of the House of 
Representatives to “make available to the public the determination and any reasons for the 
determination” of the judicial council that consideration of impeachment of an Article III 
judge may be warranted). The provision does not bar (nor might it be able to, under First 
Amendment doctrine) complainants from making their concerns public. 
States have parallel provisions. See, e.g., MONT. CT. R. ARB. FEE DISPUTES 9.2. An 
example of a provision applying immunity to those staff evaluating the complaint 
proceedings against a mediator is N.D. R. CT. 8.9(g)(7)(B) (“Board members and staff are 
immune from suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties [in the ethics 
enforcement procedure].”). 
143  The Uniform Arbitration Act has been enacted in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, and 
West Virginia, and in 2015 was introduced in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. See 
Legislative Fact Sheet—Arbitration Act (2000), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) 
(last visited June 30, 2015). 
144  The Act has been adopted in the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,  
Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and  
Washington. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Mediation Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Mediation%20Act (last visited 
June 30, 2015). 
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proceedings.”145 In contrast, the Uniform Arbitration Act does not include a 
provision on confidentiality; a comment on judicial enforcement of arbitral 
awards reminds users that “[b]ecause of the involvement of important legal 
rights, a court should review more carefully claims of confidentiality, trade 
secrets, privilege, or other matters protected from disclosure than other 
assertions that a preaward order of an arbitrator is invalid.”146 
In short, research into the rule structures of the different kinds of ADR 
demonstrates both the breadth of regulation and the invisibility of the public as 
a category in need of attention. While a few rules provide for inclusion, more 
often implicit mention is made of exclusion through obligations of 
confidentiality. To the extent that the public emerged, the context was generally 
to insulate mediations and settlement discussions from disclosure. Finding 
affirmative clear rules on public access to ADR proceedings is difficult. 
On the other hand, court-annexed arbitration, as practiced in some of the 
high-volume jurisdictions, exemplifies the capacity for ADR to include a public 
dimension. In Illinois, arbitrations are open and often conducted in courthouses 
or special centers,147 and the outcomes become part of a court-created 
database.148 An example from the federal system comes from the federal 
                                                        
145  UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note (2003). The act also notes that state laws regulating 
the confidentiality of proceedings may have an impact, as it provides for references to 
transparency requirements, by offering square brackets—as in this quote—to reference the 
possibility of statutory obligations of open process. See id. § 8 (“CONFIDENTIALITY. 
Unless subject to the [insert statutory references to open meetings act and open records act], 
mediation communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by 
other law or rule of this State.”). 
146  UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 18 cmt. 1 (2000), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org 
/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration_final_00.pdf. 
147  See, e.g., ANN B. JORGENSEN & HOLLIS L. WEBSTER, STATE OF ILL., CNTY. OF DUPAGE 
COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY ARBITRATION PROGRAM, ARBITRATOR’S BENCH BOOK 13–14 
(3d rev. 2011), available at http://www.dupageco.org/Courts/Docs/34145/. According to a 
telephone interview with the 18th circuit arbitration administrator, arbitration hearings are 
public in all counties in Illinois. Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Loretta Glenny, 
Arbitration Admin., Ill. 18th Judicial Dist. (Sept. 29, 2014). The proceedings take place 
either in courthouses that sometimes have “Mandatory Arbitration Centers” or the 
proceedings are held in other buildings. ILLINOIS UNIFORM ARBITRATOR REFERENCE 
MANUAL, supra note 95, at 8; Locations and Contact Information, CIRCUIT CT.  
COOK COUNTY, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/aboutthecourt/OfficeoftheChiefJudge/Court 
RelatedServices/MandatoryArbitration/LocationsandContactInformation.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GL6M-2PXN. The rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois are not clear on 
public access. The comment to Illinois’s supreme court rule regarding scheduling arbitration 
hearings explains that the “use of courthouse facilities provides a desirable quasi-judicial 
atmosphere” and centralization offers efficiencies as well as monitoring of the progress of 
cases. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 88 cmt. 
148  Posted reports from 2004 to 2011 can be found on the Illinois courts’ websites. See 
Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration Annual Reports, ILL. CTS., http://www.state.il.us 
/court/Administrative/ManArb/default.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/L984-J7VJ. Further, 
as noted supra note 95, Illinois’ mandatory arbitration is akin to abbreviated trials. As of 
2011, 41,302 cases were referred to arbitration; about three-quarters were settled or 
dismissed prior to arbitration, and about 600 of those that did arbitrate proceeded from 
 
1668 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1631  
district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which also locates its 
arbitrations in open courtrooms in its courthouse.149 In addition, rules 
occasionally mention the possibility of creating a stenographic record of a 
court-annexed arbitration.150 Yet even in these instances, local rules do not 
always make clear that the proceedings are open. More generally, as currently 
constituted, court-based ADR does little to build publicity into the new 
processes that it promotes, even as those processes are located in and 
increasingly equated with what courts “do.”151 
VII. VALUING PUBLICITY: CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES  
AND REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS 
I have mapped the changing content over hundreds of years in the “values 
and goals” of procedural systems. The idea of expansive rights of access—to 
bring claims to courts and to watch courts—came to be secured during the past 
three centuries. Constitutional texts enshrine “open courts” and “public trials” 
as obligations, and the political ideology of one’s “day in court,” “rights to 
court,” and right to “open courts” continues to hold sway in popular discourse, 
awash with media presentations of trials. Yet the practices that anchor the idea 
                                                                                                                                
arbitration to trial. See SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR STATE FISCAL 
YEAR 2011, at 5 (2011), available at http://www.state.il.us/court/Administrative/ManArb 
/2011/ManArbRpt11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9FDM-BK9H. 
149  See Kelly, Milione & Porter, Memo, Court-Annexed Arbitration, supra note 13, at 3. The 
location of court-annexed arbitration in courtrooms ought not to be equated with public 
access; as staff explained, in some districts, courtrooms may be used, while the proceedings 
are nonetheless closed to the public. 
150  See, e.g., N.C. IREDELL CNTY. ADR R. 5(f) (“There shall be no record made of any ADR 
proceedings under these Rules, unless the parties have agreed to binding arbitration, in 
which case any party may request that a record be made.”); MONT. CT. R. ARB. FEE DISPUTES 
7.9 (providing that either party can, at its own expense, “have the entire proceeding recorded 
by a court report or by mechanical means,” and if so, that the other party has a right to the 
transcript if bearing the expense of obtaining one.); ILLINOIS UNIFORM ARBITRATOR 
REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 95, at 12 (explaining that a court reporter is not provided 
but parties may arrange for stenographic records at their own expense); cf. MO., 11TH CIR. 
CT. R. 38.6, providing that “[n]o stenographic, electronic, or other record of an A.D.R. 
process shall be made,” and including arbitration in Rule 38.1(2) as an “A.D.R. program”. In 
contrast, Utah provides that records of proceedings “shall be destroyed at such time as an 
award becomes final or upon a demand for a trial de novo.” See UTAH R. COURT-ANNEXED 
ADR 102(g). 
151  The process of reaching agreement is, however, distinct from the agreements made; 
keeping outcomes confidential requires different arguments about one or more of the parties’ 
interests in nondisclosure—to avoid, for example, others bringing similar claims or people 
knowing about funds received. Law sometimes intervenes, based on what is often termed the 
public’s “need to know,” to insist on “sunshine.” For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act 
provides that settlements not be sealed—animated in part by the view that similarly-situated 
co-workers would benefit from the information and employers ought not be able to impose 
silence as the price of a settlement. Some states require that medical malpractice payments 
over a certain amount be posted on the web. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 456.041(4) (West Supp. 
2015) (requiring reporting of payments of malpractice claims that exceed $100,000). 
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of courts as “open” are on the wane. While substantial energies have been 
directed to reformatting court-based procedures, those efforts have generally 
not inscribed a place for the public. 
The question that emerges is the relationship of constitutional open-court 
obligations to the privatizing modes of government-based, non-trial 
adjudication, quasi-adjudication, and mediated dispute resolution. Below I 
provide an account of the law, followed by an analysis of what law could 
mandate and why. The doctrine puts into sharp relief the stakes of procedural 
rule changes, revising the experiences of courts in service of particular logics. 
The federal law of open courts starts with the Sixth Amendment, which 
guarantees criminal defendants a “speedy and public trial” before a jury drawn 
from the “district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”152 Judges 
interpret this Sixth Amendment guarantee when addressing the legality of the 
exclusion of the public in criminal proceedings from the vantage point of the 
defendant.153 (Article III, rarely referenced in open-court law, references that 
no person can be convicted of treason unless on the “Testimony of two 
Witnesses . . . or on Confession in open Court.”154) In addition, in cases 
brought by the press and the public seeking to attend criminal proceedings, 
judges discuss public rights of audience based on First Amendment speech, 
assembly, and petition rights;155 Seventh Amendment civil jury rights; and 
common law English and American practices. State constitutions offer 
additional bases through their textual guarantees of “open courts.” 
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on access to civil trials 
and related proceedings, the Court’s jurisprudence in the criminal context—
requiring public access for trials, voir dire, and pre-trial suppression 
hearings156—has prompted lower court judges to conclude that civil 
proceedings are presumptively open. Using a mix of constitutional and 
common law doctrine, circuit courts have found constitutional access rights to 
civil trials, to related court-based proceedings, and in some circuits, to most of 
the documents filed in court.157 
                                                        
152  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
153  See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010). 
154  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
155  See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984); 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Judith Resnik, Due Process: 
A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987); discussion infra notes 157–77 and 
accompanying text. The Sixth Amendment right of the defendant is sometimes said to 
produce a right—or the “freedom” of the public to “listen.” See Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U.S. at 576. 
156  See Presley, 558 U.S. 209; Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). Simonson analyzed 
the uneven application of these rulings in the lower courts. Simonson, supra note 56, at 
2195–96. 
157  A list of the circuits, as of 2013, which had found access rights to civil trials is provided 
in Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014). See also Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 
F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 
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The test commonly deployed is that “[a] proceeding qualifies for the First 
Amendment right of public access”158 when “there has been a tradition of 
accessibility” to that proceeding and when “access plays a significant positive 
role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”159 Thus, when a 
closure is challenged, current doctrine charges judges with assessing the history 
of a given proceeding (experience) and examining the utilities of openness or 
closure (logic).160 If a proceeding qualifies as open, the next decision is whether 
special considerations justify a narrowly tailored closure. 
As discussed, the practices of adjudication have been transformed over the 
last two centuries, and courthouses have expanded accordingly. Early 
courthouses, such as that in Fulton County, New York, were a single room; 
today, courtrooms can be less than ten percent of the footprint of a courthouse, 
and judges do much of their work off the bench—on the phone or in meetings 
in their chambers.161 Indeed, a recent study found a “steady year-over-year 
decline in total courtroom hours” from 2008 to 2012 that continued into 2013. 
Federal judges spent less than two hours a day on average in the courtroom, or 
about “423 hours of open court proceedings per active district judge” 
annually.162 As a consequence, an account of the history of “place and 
process”163 requires acknowledging that the “judgment of experience”164 is 
                                                                                                                                
F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2011)); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 
1984) (“We hold that the First Amendment does secure a right of access to civil 
proceedings.”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding a 
right of access to litigation committee reports in shareholder derivative suits); Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the First Amendment limits judicial discretion to seal documents in a civil 
case)). Access to documents—at least those deemed “judicial” documents filed in civil cases 
as part of lawsuits—has likewise received protection. See United States v. Erie Cnty., 763 
F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014); Courthouse News Serv., 750 F. 3d 776; Hartford Courant Co. v. 
Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004). 
158  Strine, 733 F.3d at 514. 
159  See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).This 
test was developed from Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, in 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584–98 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
160  The Third Circuit explained: “Under the experience prong of the experience and logic 
test, we ‘consider whether “the place and process have historically been open to the press 
and general public,” because such a “tradition of accessibility implies the favorable 
judgment of experience.” ’ ” Strine, 733 F.3d at 515 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2002), which in turn quoted Press-Enterprise II, 478 
U.S. at 8). 
161  D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 453, 462 
(2007). 
162  See Singer & Young, supra note 74, at 565–67. 
163  Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
164  Id. A related point is whether the historical record needs to be “unbroken.” See Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 18–21, Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1551 
(2014) (No. 13-869), 2014 WL 262086, cert. denied [hereinafter Strine Petition for 
Certiorari]. 
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uncoupling the ready equation of judges and courts with work in open 
courtrooms. 
The evaluation of the logic prong requires deciding whether “access plays 
a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question.”165 One answer could be to return to (or to collapse logic into) the 
“judgment of experience”166: if those conducting court-annexed arbitration, for 
example, make the process private, one could rely on that experience as the 
basis for keeping the procedures closed. The troubling circularity—turning 
what is into what ought to be—is not the kind of logic that logicians admire, let 
alone normative theorists looking for criteria by which to decide how to assess 
new procedures. 
Alternatively, the “logic” of public processes could be independent of 
history—grounded in empirical arguments that public proceedings do, in 
identified circumstances, produce useful results or in normative views of the 
contributions of openness. With or without data, deciding whether openness 
plays a “significant positive role” entails choosing a vantage point—individual 
litigants, courts, the public, or social welfare more generally—from which to 
take that measurement, as well as deciding on what counts as a “positive” 
value. 
If the goal is dispositions and if both disputants and commentators argue 
(or demonstrate) that confidentiality facilitates resolutions, then closure plays a 
“significant positive role.” If one offers Benthamite claims of public education 
and of the disciplinary force that observers impose on judges and litigants, then 
closure has a negative impact. If, as I have argued, public courts provide 
opportunities to practice the democratic norms of respectful engagement in 
conflicts about what justness requires, then open courts serve as one of 
democracy’s sites, not to be closed off.167 In short, choices abound about which 
values to adopt; which perspectives to privilege; what empirics to use to shape 
the cost/benefit analysis and how to weigh the tradeoffs and marginal utilities; 
and whether to embrace or rebuff utilitarian accounts. 
Returning to the case law, judges—occasionally referencing Bentham168—
regularly deploy his concerns, as they posit that openness supports informed 
discussions of government, fosters perceptions of fairness, checks corruption, 
enhances performance, facilitates accountability, discourages fraud, and 
                                                        
165  Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
166  The Court looked to whether the “particular type of government processing had 
historically been open in our free society.” PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 108 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
167  RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 48, at 288–337; Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: 
“Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. art. 1, at 
52 (2011). 
168  See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 (1948); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 566, 569–70 (1980). The plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, 
cited here, was written by Chief Justice Burger. 
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permits communities to vent emotions.169 When doing so, judges use a loose 
amalgam of empirical claims and normative assessments, often without 
delineating or specifying the criteria for either. 
Discussions of a few cases illustrate the application of the doctrine and the 
challenges posed by court-based ADR. A 1980s state court ruling offers one 
example of the judiciary’s willingness to reject even long-standing practice in 
favor of public access to criminal proceedings. At that time, the rule in New 
York, “almost universally applied,” was to close and lock courtroom doors 
when a judge charged a jury in a criminal case.170 The proffered rationale was 
to protect jurors from distraction.171 Yet an intermediate appellate bench ruled 
that “however hoary and time-honored such a practice may be,” it did not pass 
constitutional muster because of the centrality of public trials in generating 
confidence in courts.172 
In October of 2014, another effort at closure—this time of civil 
proceedings—was rebuffed. The issue was the legality of “forcible cell 
extractions” of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, who were taken from their cells 
and placed in restraints to be force-fed. Abu Wa’el Dhiab sought to enjoin the 
U.S. government from doing so, and the government filed a motion to seal the 
hearing on the preliminary injunction.173 District Judge Gladys Kessler rejected 
the request. The judge quoted the 1984 ruling in Press-Enterprise I, which 
stated that: 
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending 
trials [and other proceedings] can have confidence that standards of fairness are 
being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance 
that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become 
known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the . . . trial and the 
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.174 
In a related decision about access to videotapes that had been sealed, the 
district court further explained that limits on access had to be justified by an 
“overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve 
                                                        
169  United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
170  New York v. Venters, 511 N.Y.S. 2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
171  Id. at 284. 
172  Id. at 283–85. 
173  Memorandum Opinion to the Order Denying Government’s Motion to Close Hearing, 
Dhiab v. Obama, No. 05-1457(GK), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140049 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2014). 
A related request, on the unsealing twenty-eight videotapes, was decided on October 3, 2014 
and is discussed infra notes 175–177. In November of 2014, the district court denied the 
petitioner’s preliminary injunction motion (as modified as the “Government had taken 
several positive actions which responded to his complaints”). Memorandum Opinion to the 
Order Denying Petitioner’s Application for Preliminary Injunction, Dhiab, docket item no. 
366, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014).  
174  Memorandum Opinion to the Order Denying Government’s Motion to Close Hearing, 
Dhiab,  2014 WL 4942239, at *3 (alterations in original). 
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higher values.”175 Judge Kessler explained that the law requires the government 
to specify what information required protection, and why, when it attempted to 
seal court records relating to Guantánamo Bay litigants.176 Even in the context 
of claims for security, the court held that generic sealing was not appropriate, 
and that, instead, tailored rationales for narrow categories of closure requests 
were required.177 
The videotape sealing question is illustrative of the issues raised when the 
closure of court-based adjudication moves across a spectrum from the 
convention of trials and court-based proceedings to a variety of newly 
fashioned processes. These variations have prompted judges to reflect on 
access rights to “trials and related proceedings” in contexts blurring the line 
between courts and their alternatives.178 In 2011, for example, the Second 
Circuit considered the limited access accorded to proceedings conducted by the 
New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”), which had come to function as 
a low-level, criminal court. When individuals failed to pay fares, jumped 
turnstiles, or were otherwise misbehaving in the New York City transit system, 
the NYCTA issued notices of violations, totaling in one year about 125,000.179 
Of that number, some 20,000 citations were contested at in-person hearings in 
which Transit Authority officers (lawyers appointed by the Authority’s 
President and paid per-diem) presided.180 
                                                        
175  Memorandum Opinion to the Order Granting Intervenors’ Motion to Unseal Videotapes, 
Dhiab, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140684, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2014) (citing Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). 
176  Id. at *9. 
177  Id. at *10–11. The district court watched the videos, reviewed the government arguments 
for sealing, and held that the videos had to be unsealed, with some specific conditions. Id. at 
18–29. 
178  Limited access to decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is another 
arena in which the question of the relationship of openness to courts is contested. See 50 
U.S.C. § 1803(c) (2012); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 
2014) (holding that the government must disclose redacted documents concerning the 
government’s legal analysis of drone strikes, in response to a FOIA request). As of June 
2015, seventy opinions of the FISA court had become public, some through leaks. See NSA 
Documents: FISA Court Orders/Opinions, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu 
.org/nsa-documents-search?f[0]=field__nsa_documents_type_of_doc%3A466 (last visited 
June 22, 2015). 
Members of Congress along with several commentators have argued that the failure to 
publish FISA rulings is a source of the diminished confidence in that court. See, e.g., David 
S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 209,  
277 (2014); Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and  
Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (2013); Jillian Rayfield, Senators  
Push Bill to Declassify FISA Court Rulings, SALON (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/06/11/senators_push_bill_to_declassify_fisa_court_rulings/. In 
2014, Senator Leahy joined several other co-sponsoring senators in seeking to revise the 
procedures of the FISA Court. See S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2014). 
179  See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 290 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
180  Id. 
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In order to attend, a prospective observer had, under Transit Authority 
rules, to obtain permission from respondent-defendants; each respondent had to 
agree, twice.181 The Transit Authority argued that requiring permission was 
necessary to protect privacy and to avoid “chilling” individuals from requesting 
hearings. The plaintiff, the New York Civil Liberties Union, argued that closure 
prevented the public from obtaining necessary information about police 
practices; for example, the Civil Liberties Union alleged that investigations into 
the “demographic characteristics of those stopped and frisked by the New York 
City Police Department officers on public transit” suggested that “minorities 
receive[d] a disproportionate number of citations” for violating the rules.182 The 
Second Circuit concluded under the “experience and logic” test that a qualified 
First Amendment right of access existed.183 While bracketing the reach of its 
ruling to other administrative proceedings, the Second Circuit held that the 
NYCTA’s “ ‘quasi-judicial’ administrative proceedings” were so like criminal 
trials that openness was obligatory.184 
New York’s use of the NYCTA as a court aimed to dispose of a high 
volume of low-level infractions. Closed procedures in the Delaware Chancery 
Court had a different purpose; the Delaware legislature, worried about 
maintaining the state’s “preeminence” in corporate dispute resolution, created a 
special program in 2009 to attract high-end users.185 The legislature offered 
what it called an “arbitration” program, run by the Chancery Court’s judges and 
held in their courthouses; eligibility turned on at least one of the disputants 
being incorporated in Delaware, one million dollars or more at stake, and the 
parties’ willingness to pay $12,000 in filing fees and $6,000 daily thereafter. 
Filings were not on the public docketing system, and the public was not 
permitted to attend. The Chancery judges’ decisions were enforceable as 
judgments, subject to review by the Delaware Supreme Court, which had not, 
as of 2013, provided rules about whether any such appeals would be 
confidential.186 Thus, unlike the “court-annexed arbitrations” in various state 
and federal district courts, Delaware authorized courts-as-arbitration. 
A group called the “Coalition for Open Government” argued that 
Delaware’s legislation violated the First Amendment’s right of the public to 
observe court proceedings; the lawsuit, Delaware Coalition for Open 
                                                        
181  Id. at 292. 
182  Id. at 293. 
183  Id. at 298–303 & n.9 (also noting that six Justices in Richmond Newspapers shared these 
views on civil trial access rights). 
184  Id. at 299–303. 
185  H.R. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West 
Supp. 2015); DEL. CT. CH. R. 96–98. 
186  Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012).; see 
also Thomas J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, or Closed Door 
Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 349 
(2013). He described confidentiality as the “most notable feature” of the Delaware program. 
Id. at 354. 
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Government, Inc. v. Strine, named Leo E. Strine, Jr., then the Chancellor of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, as the lead defendant. After a federal district 
judge agreed that the program was “essentially a civil trial” that could not be 
closed,187 Delaware’s Chancery Court judges appealed and lost again. The 
Third Circuit concluded that “Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration” 
could not constitutionally be held in a courthouse and bar the public.188 
In reaching that conclusion, Judge Dolores Sloviter, writing for the 
majority, relied on the experience and logic test. Declining to accept at “face 
value” the state’s designation of its program as an “arbitration,” the opinion 
excavated the history of both arbitrations and trials.189 That account ran from 
English common law trials in 1267 through the American Revolution to the 
current time, as she documented that civil trials were—and are—public.190 The 
question of public access to arbitration before the twentieth century was more 
complex, as some proceedings were open.191 Closed arbitrations became 
common after the advent of the 1920 New York arbitration law, the 1925 
                                                        
187  Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502. 
188  Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 521 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014). 
189  Id. at 515–18. 
190  See id. at 733 F.3d at 516. (“[E]vidence was delivered ‘in the open Court and in the 
Presence of the Parties, their Attorneys, Council, and all By-standers, and before the Judge 
and Jury . . . .’ ” (quoting Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir. 
1984))). 
191  Id. at 517 (citing Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before 
the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 468 (1984)). Knowing the degree to which 
arbitrations were open to third parties is impossible. Historians have identified examples in 
which eighteenth and nineteenth century arbitrations were akin to trials, albeit without juries, 
and many proceedings included spectators. See Mann, supra; see also AMALIA D. KESSLER, 
INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL 
CULTURE, 1800–1877 ch. 4 (forthcoming) (on file with author). Moreover, a rich history of 
English arbitrations pre-Roman Britannia through the Elizabethan Age documents the 
mélange of public and private that endowed third-party arbitrators with authority to resolve 
disputes and public access to many of the proceedings. See DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY 
ENGLISH ARBITRATION (2008); DEREK ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION: 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER ELIZABETH I (2015). My thanks to John Langbein for 
suggesting this resource. 
Recent research on English and colonial practice also requires reassessing the view of 
the role played by the judiciary in enforcing arbitration agreements in earlier centuries. 
Under a 1698 statute, the British Parliament created a mechanism for parties to obtain 
referrals to arbitration and for the court to enforce awards through contempt powers. This 
approach was adopted in more than twenty American jurisdictions, including both before 
and after colonies became states. James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America: The 
Early History, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 241, 246–51 (2013). 
In contrast, by the time of the enactment of the federal legislation on arbitration in 
1925, the argument for the statute was that courts did not enforce arbitration agreements. 
Moreover, by then, arbitrations were styled as closed processes, and since its founding in 
1926, the AAA has described privacy as a central feature of arbitrations. See FRANCES 
KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 72, 88 
(1948). 
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United States Arbitration Act (later named the Federal Arbitration Act192), and 
the growth of the market for arbitrators.193 
Given the historical divergence between trial and arbitration, a key to the 
majority decision was to categorize what Delaware judges were doing as 
trials.194 “Delaware’s proceedings are conducted by Chancery Court judges, in 
Chancery Court during ordinary court hours, and yield judgments that are 
enforceable in the same way as judgments resulting from ordinary Chancery 
Court proceedings. Delaware’s proceedings derive a great deal of legitimacy 
and authority from the state.”195 As the concurring opinion by Judge Julio 
Fuentes put it, “the air of [an] official State-run proceeding” made the limit on 
public access unconstitutional.196 
In terms of the “logic” of privacy, the majority underscored the benefits to 
the public of knowing how “Delaware resolves major business disputes.”197 
The court discounted arguments about the harms that public access would 
cause, in part by noting that other methods existed to enable businesses to 
protect their trade secrets and by arguing that even if court-based “arbitration” 
was public, it would continue to offer flexibility and informality.198 In the end, 
public “faith in the Delaware judicial system” was the more weighty 
consideration in deciding the “First Amendment right of access to Delaware’s 
government-sponsored arbitrations.”199 
A competing application of the experience/logic test came from the dissent, 
written by Judge Jane Roth;200 that approach illustrates the ways in which the 
                                                        
192  In 1947, Congress repealed the United States Arbitration Act and enacted a revised 
version, entitled the Federal Arbitration Act. See Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947). 
193  The presumption of contemporary arbitration as confidential is central to the discussion 
in both the majority and the dissent in Strine, 733 F.3d at 517–18; id. at 524–26 (Roth, J., 
dissenting). 
194  Strine, 733 F.3d at 518 (“Proceedings in front of judges in courthouses have been 
presumptively open to the public for centuries.”). 
195  Id. at 520. 
196  See id. at 522–23 (Fuentes, J., concurring). 
197  Id. at 519 (majority opinion). 
198  Id. at 519–521. 
199  Id. at 521. 
200  See id. at 523 (Roth, J., dissenting). Her views were reiterated forcefully in a petition for 
certiorari that, despite the support of a host of amicus law firms and institutions, was denied 
in the winter of 2014. See Strine Petition for Certiorari, supra note 164. Amici included the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, TechNet, a large group of law firms, 
and NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. and NYSE Euronext. See Brief of the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America and Business Roundtable as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014) (No. 
13-869), 2014 WL 709719 [hereinafter Strine Chamber Brief]; Brief for TechNet as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 709721 [hereinafter Strine 
TechNet Brief]; Brief for Law Firms as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Strine, 134 
S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 768323 [hereinafter Strine Law Firms Brief]; Brief of NASDAQ 
OMX Group, Inc. and NYSE Euronext as Amici Curiae in Support of Granting the Petition, 
Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 787212 [hereinafter Strine NASDAQ Brief]. 
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current constitutional doctrine permits widely varying assessments of the 
history and values at stake.201 The dissent focused on the centrality of privacy, 
insulating both the process and the outcomes of arbitrations from public 
scrutiny.202 In the dissent’s account, confidentiality was “one of the primary 
reasons why litigants choose arbitration.”203 What the dissent described is what 
economists call the potential “wealth effects,” as management may be 
concerned about the impact on valuation of a corporation when knowledge of 
its conflicts become public, and shareholders, the government, and consumers 
react to claims made in litigation.204 In addition to protecting corporations from 
adverse publicity, the dissent also argued for the desirability of closure, in that 
excluding outsiders would ensure a collegial setting, conducive to producing 
resolutions.205 
Moving from the participants’ interest in closure to that of the state, Judge 
Roth explained why closure had a “logic” from the state’s vantage point. Given 
that leading purveyors of ADR offered confidentiality,206 Delaware could be at 
a competitive disadvantage, as it needed to attract business to its courts so as to 
                                                        
201  Further, the concurring opinion by Judge Fuentes insisted that the court had not 
expressed views on the “constitutionality of a law that may allow sitting Judges to conduct 
private arbitrations if the system set up by such a law varies in certain respects” (unspecified 
in his opinion) from what Delaware had provided. Strine, 733 F.3d at 523 (Fuentes, J., 
concurring). 
202  Id. at 524–26 (Roth, J., dissenting). As Judge Roth explained, because the concurring 
opinion by Judge Fuentes otherwise would have upheld judges functioning as arbitrators and 
rested his objection on the unconstitutionality of confidentiality, her dissent focused on 
where she departed from his concurrence. Id. at 525. 
203  Id. at 525. 
204  See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 945, 961–66 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell 
eds., 2007). 
205  See Strine, 733 F.3d at 525 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
206  Id. at 525–26; see, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, R-
25 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he arbitrator and the AAA shall maintain the privacy of the 
hearings,” and that the arbitrators shall have the power to exclude anyone who is not 
“essential” to the proceedings); NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: STATEMENT OF  
PRINCIPLES, principle 12(2) (1998), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc= 
ADRSTG_005014; Rules of Conditionally Binding Arbitration, Rule 31: Confidentiality of 
Records, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/council/programs-services 
/dispute-handling-and-resolution/dispute-resolution-rules-and-brochures/rules-of-con 
ditionally-binding-arbitration/#ConfidentialityofRecords (last visited June 30, 2015) (“It is 
our policy that records of the dispute resolution process are private and confidential.”); 
JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures, Rule 26, Confidentiality and  
Privacy, JAMS (July 1, 2014), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration 
/#Rule%2026 (limiting public access to proceedings before the Judicial Arbitration and 
Management Services). But see Pokorny v. Quiztar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 996–1002 (9th Cir. 
2010) (finding unenforceable ADR provisions including confidentiality that created one-
sided advantages). 
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maintain its “prestige and goodwill.”207 Because parties volunteered for the 
program, the dissent saw the judicial power as derivative of the parties, rather 
than the state;208 parties’ consent to the process was another reason why no 
constitutional impediment existed to the closure. In short, the dissent’s 
approach mixed empirical claims about what prospective users would do (“go 
elsewhere” if Delaware’s proceedings were not closed) and normative views of 
the importance of states being able to compete successfully in the marketplace 
of dispute resolution by offering what the private sector proffered—privacy—
as a selling point for the court-based procedure as well.209 
Another facet of the state’s efforts to gain a competitive edge was not 
mentioned by any of the three opinions: Delaware was offering below-market 
prices. Private arbitrators often charge fees significantly in excess of the $6,000 
per day for which Delaware was renting the expertise and status provided by its 
judges and courthouses.210 Through that pricing, the state both hoped to put its 
judges on the global stage, poised to attract business, and to enable the state to 
attract more corporations to pay charter fees (of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, in some instances) to incorporate in Delaware so as to be eligible to use 
its court-based program.211 Moreover, as Professor Tom Stipanowich has noted, 
judges had a personal reason to promote the program. They could use their 
experience as a “sterling entrée into a post-judicial career as an arbitrator and 
mediator—the retirement plan du jour for American judges.”212 
Although the 2013 decision—and the Supreme Court’s decision not to 
grant review in 2014—stopped the Delaware confidential arbitrations, the 
pressures to use that model have not abated. Professor Stipanowich explained 
that the “impetus” for Delaware’s efforts213—the volume of litigation, delays in 
some courts, and public discovery rights—continues. Yet, while looking for 
                                                        
207  Strine, 733 F.3d at 519. The dissent did not offer an argument that my colleague, Roberta 
Romano, suggested: that if more cases were decided by Delaware’s judges than by private 
arbitrators, Delaware could protect the application and integrity of its law through having its 
judges be the repeated sources of its application—albeit in private. Professor Romano also 
noted that corporations were more likely to select venues for incorporation because of 
substantive legal obligations than for this form of a procedural opportunity. See generally 
Roberta Romano, The Market for Corporate Law Redux, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi, ed., forthcoming 2015). 
208  Strine, 733 F.3d at 525, n.4 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
209  Id. at 526. 
210  Judge Roth’s opinion could also have drawn on a range of lower court decisions 
permitting closures in other contexts. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 
F. 3d 198 (3d. Cir. 2002) (upholding closing of deportation hearings out of concerns about 
national security). 
211  Stipanowich, supra note 186, at 350–57. 
212  Id. at 350. 
213  Id. at 351–52. 
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alternatives, private arbitration outside of courts has not provided the kind of 
control and discipline that some businesses seek when facing disputes.214 
Thus, as one amicus had argued to the Third Circuit, as it urged the 
appellate court to overturn the district court’s invalidation of the court-based 
closed proceedings, businesses were “weary of private arbitration” and sought 
“predictability” by turning to the Chancery judges.215 As Professor Stipanowich 
put it, Delaware’s judges were “first-rate adjudicator[s],” schooled in the state’s 
law, well known for their “efficient case management” (with rules setting forth 
times for hearings within three months of filing). Further, unlike arbitrators 
paid by the day, the fees went to the state and therefore created no incentives 
for the Delaware judges to permit arbitrations to proceed slowly.216 In other 
words, the “faith in the Delaware Judicial System” that Judge Sloviter 
described in Strine to be at risk by closure217 was the very attribute that these 
disputants wanted, albeit outside the purview of the public. 
One response to the interest in judicial oversight would be to draft 
arbitration contracts that include the opportunity for either party to go to court 
to obtain review of the merits. But in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
contractual provisions seeking to do so; the Court refused to interpret the 
Federal Arbitration Act to permit court review as consistent with the grounds 
authorized by the statute for the vacature of awards, and the Court declined to 
permit parties, under federal law, to expand the bases of courts’ jurisdiction to 
review arbitrations beyond those specified in the statute.218 
Yet market pressures for court-based closed proceedings have not abated. 
After the Third Circuit held the Delaware program unconstitutional, the judges 
petitioned for certiorari, and they were joined by several amici briefs in seeking 
to overturn the lower courts. The filings repeatedly extolled the value of 
confidentiality. Twenty-three law firms “from throughout the [n]ation” insisted 
on the importance of “confidentiality, flexible procedures, and access to 
                                                        
214  Id. at 353 (citing a survey he and others had done to evaluate perspectives by Fortune 
1,000 corporations on ADR). 
215  Strine TechNet Brief, supra note 200, at 10 (quoting Jessica Tyndall, The Delaware 
Arbitration Experiment: Not Just a “Secret Court,” 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 395, 
408 (2013)). 
216  Stipanowich, supra note 186, at 350, 356. He was critical of the Delaware program and 
supportive of the ruling finding it unconstitutional. Id. at 351. 
217  Strine, 733 F.3d at 521. 
218  Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). Yet the majority added the 
caveat that parties could provide for “enforcement under state statutory or common law, . . . 
where judicial review of different scope is arguable.” Id. at 590. As a consequence, a few 
state courts have read Hall Street to permit them the un-preempted leeway to accord review 
(as a matter of state “procedure,” rather than arbitration’s “substance”) more expansive than 
does the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Cable Connection Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P. 
3d 586, 594, 604–05 (Cal. 2008); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 93–94 (Tex. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 455 (2011). A few state courts have reached the opposite 
conclusion. See, e.g., HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725 (Me. 2011); Brookfield 
Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 696 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2011). 
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arbitrators with expertise in Delaware corporate law.”219 The Chamber of 
Commerce and the Business Roundtable added that closure was “of great 
importance to the nation’s business community.”220 Echoing Judge Roth’s 
dissent in Strine, the Chamber asserted that “businesses, like anyone else, will 
rarely agree to arbitrate without the assurance of confidentiality.”221 “[O]pen 
proceedings” were “incompatible” with commercial arbitration.222 As another 
amicus put it, the point was to avoid the “reputational damage that could flow 
from highly adversarial and public disputes.”223 Further, an amicus filing by 
TechNet, a group of technology and venture capital companies, linked 
Delaware’s program to “America’s global leadership in technology and 
innovation.”224 
One amicus pointed to another program that Delaware had pioneered in 
2003, seeking to attract “technology disputes” to its Chancery courts. That 
statute, providing a confidential mediation petitioning process, was promoted 
by Leo Strine who, when Vice Chancellor, sought legislation to enable 
“mediation-only filings” so that disputants could enlist judges as mediators. 
Going to a courthouse impressed upon the parties the “dignity and importance” 
of the process. His view was that the state should offer judges to “businesses 
hoping to achieve a just settlement without making their dispute public.”225 
The program, as enacted, requires that potential disputants have more than 
a million dollars at stake, that the parties consent to Delaware’s jurisdiction, 
and that at least one party be a business entity formed or organized under 
Delaware law or having is principal place of business in Delaware.226 
Disputants can then file a confidential petition “not of public record” to specify 
the issues to be mediated. Chancery judges or masters are authorized to serve as 
                                                        
219  Strine Law Firms Brief, supra note 200, at 1–2. 
220  Strine Chamber Brief, supra note 200, at 2. In addition, NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., the 
“principle stock exchange operators” in the United States also filed in support of overturning 
the Third Circuit. See Strine NASDAQ Brief, supra note 200. 
221  Strine Chamber Brief, supra note 200, at 4–5. 
222  Id. at 12. 
223  Strine NASDAQ Brief, supra note 200, at 3; see Romano, supra note 207. 
224  Strine TechNet Brief, supra note 200, at 1 (explaining that it was “an association of the 
chief executive officers and senior executives of the Nation’s leading technology 
companies” in technology, e-commerce, venture capital, and other fields, and the group of 
businesses employed more than two million people and had revenue in excess of $800 
billion). TechNet argued that the Third Circuit’s decision was both a “novel” constitutional 
holding and in conflict with the Supreme Court’s expansion of the reach of mandates to 
arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 3–4; see also, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011). 
225  Leo E. Strine, Jr., “Mediation-Only” Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can 
New Value Be Added by One of America’s Business Courts?, 53 DUKE L.J. 585, 592–94 
(2003). 
226  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 347(a) (West 2006). 
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mediators—at $10,000 for the first day and $5,000 for every day thereafter.227 
In other words, in addition to the procedure struck in Strine, Delaware currently 
has another path for certain disputants to obtain private access to its courts and 
its judges. 
The question is whether this program, if challenged, would be found 
constitutional. Can documents, styled “mediation petitions” be filed in court but 
closed to the public? The case law to date on public access to court filings has 
focused on whether the materials are “judicial documents” related to litigation; 
some circuits permit more access to documents than do others.228 How would 
one characterize Delaware’s “mediation petitions”? Defenders of keeping 
confidential the documents requesting Delaware’s judge-mediators to 
participate in a process in which neither the filings nor the activities were “of 
public record” would argue that such petitions—and the process that results—
aim to avoid, rather than be part of, litigation. Thus, this new procedure 
provides another example of the questions that lace this essay—about the 
relationship of alternative processes in courts related to commitments that 
courts be open and public venues. 
Delaware’s mediation procedures reflect and then seek to deflect these 
questions by both creating a confidential filing system and specifying a method 
of “protecting public access to the Courts.”229 The rules provide that, when 
confidentiality is asserted to seal documents, those seeking to seal have to 
provide a “public version” of the confidential filing; when filing “a complaint 
confidentially,” plaintiffs have to make their “best efforts” to give notice to 
each person with an interest and to provide a proposed public version of the 
complaint. How such “best efforts” can be policed is a question. The rules 
authorize the public or the press to challenge the closure,230 but such third 
parties would need to be informed about the pending matter by those seeking 
                                                        
227  See id.; DEL. CT. CH. R. 94(a)(4) (providing “confidential and not of public record” 
proceedings); id. R. 95(b) (outlining the details of mediation conference confidentiality); 
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DEL., MEDIATION GUIDELINE PAMPHLET 3 (Apr. 2011) 
(explaining that the fees are divided “equally among the parties”); see also Strine TechNet 
Brief, supra note 200, at 6–7 (citing this procedure in use since 2003). 
228  Compare United States v. Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014), with IDT Corp. v. 
eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1224 n.1 (8th Cir. 2013). 
A related set of questions are about the transparency of non-Article III courts in the 
federal system, and access to their filings and procedures. See, e.g., Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 
U.S. 40 (2005) (holding inappropriate the Tax Court’s practice of making the reports of its 
special judges confidential). See generally Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to 
Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195 (2008). 
229  See Protecting Public Access to the Courts: Chancery Rule 5.1, DEL. ST. CTS., 
http://courts.delaware.gov/rules/ChanceryMemorandumRule5-1.pdf (last visited June 30, 
2015). 
230  See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Amendment to Court of Chancery Rules to Delete Rule 5(g)  
and Adopt Rule 5.1 (Nov. 5, 2012), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/rules 
/ChanceryAmendmentRules5-1.pdf. 
1682 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1631  
the confidential process. Moreover, the rules do not explain whether and how 
courts are to review whatever efforts are undertaken to provide notice.231 
One might want to cabin Delaware as an outlier, famously focused on 
corporations and, in these proceedings, seeking large-value disputes in part as a 
way of attracting businesses to incorporate in Delaware and pay the significant 
required fees to do so. Yet even if the sums involved are unusual, the state’s 
programs are not idiosyncratic. Rather, they are variations on what I have 
documented is occurring in courthouses around the country, as court rules have 
effectively moved the public out of the process in tens of thousands of ordinary 
cases. As my account of local rules, databases, and overviews of ADR has 
detailed, the practice is increasingly becoming to provide privacy, not publicity. 
In mediation, other forms of evaluations, and in settlement conferences, 
whether run by judges or their designated “neutrals,” the interactions are 
confidential. 
The rules surrounding court-annexed arbitrations offer, as discussed, 
another approach. In the high-volume jurisdictions in which court-annexed 
arbitration functions as a kind of quick trial before appointed lawyers in lieu of 
judges, the practice has been to provide for these proceedings to be held in 
courtrooms and to permit the public to attend.232 Other jurisdictions close their 
court-annexed arbitrations. Indeed, some of those private court-based 
proceedings served as examples proffered by advocates arguing the legality of 
closure in the briefing in Strine but were not relied upon by any of the three 
appellate opinions.233 
Reflection is therefore in order about the tensions between the case law on 
First Amendment public access rights and the ADR rules. The decisions on jury 
charges, Guantánamo Bay, the New York City Transit Authority, and 
Delaware’s Chancery Court illustrate judicial resistance to closing off public 
access for court-based, trial-like, and trial-related proceedings. Further, the 
Strine decision refused to turn sitting judges into arbitrators—a view shared in 
the small number of reported decisions in which state or federal judges served 
as arbitrators.234 One could build on this case law to argue that court-annexed 
arbitrations must, as of right, be open, and then mount challenges in those 
                                                        
231  Cf. Protecting Public Access to the Courts: Chancery Rule 5.1, supra note 229, at 6. 
232  See supra note 135. 
233  In the briefing before the Third Circuit, the confidentiality of court-based ADR 
programs, including arbitration, was argued. See Brief for Appellee at 10, Del. Coal. for 
Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No. 12-3859), 2013 WL 
100597; Stipanowich, supra note 186, at 365. 
234  See DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d 1163 
(7th Cir. 1994) (“General Fire is correct that arbitration is not in the job description of a 
federal judge, including (see 28 U.S.C. § 636) a magistrate judge.”); Ovadiah v. New York 
Ass’n for New Americans, No. 95 Civ 10523, 1997 WL 342411, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 
1997) (“Nevertheless, as noted in DDI Seamless, there is inherent difficulty in and serious 
potential problems with having judicial officers step out of their traditional adjudicatory 
functions. Arbitrations by magistrate judges should be avoided.”). 
Summer 2015] THE CONTINGENCY OF OPENNESS IN COURTS 1683 
jurisdictions where that form of ADR is closed. That claim would be relatively 
straightforward, in that court-annexed arbitrations are trial-like, and the lawyers 
conducting the proceedings are subjected to disqualification and accorded 
immunity as judges would have. Moreover, in terms of experience and logic, 
the track record of jurisdictions providing open arbitration offers a counter to 
arguments that closure is required for arbitration to succeed.235 
Yet, even if Delaware’s court-annexed arbitration and other jurisdictions’ 
offering of this process to ordinary litigants are easy cases when contrasted 
with mediation and settlements, the split Third Circuit decision illustrates that 
public access is not secure for ADR’s most trial-like version. Moreover, the 
acculturation of judges to various forms of ADR that entail privatized 
procedure makes more likely the acceptance, as logical, of a variety of ways in 
which the public can be excluded. Further, for the formalists, reluctant to rely 
on law’s evolution, all the ADR variations fall outside what was open when the 
constitutional guarantees about public courts were adopted. 
In addition to the limits of historical analogies and the slippery slope of 
becoming accustomed to closed proceedings in court, the “logic” of most forms 
of ADR is that private accommodation is preferable to third-party resolutions; 
hence, judges ought to promote parties’ withdrawal from the public purview in 
service of public and private ends—the efficient resolutions of disputes. With 
assumptions that consent is an unproblematic preference to be honored, that 
costs are saved, and that the state’s role is policed through rules organizing 
ADR, no third-party oversight to validate legitimacy is required. 
In short, the test of experience and logic is not the equivalent of a norm that 
access to court-based decision making is required in democracies. But here, as 
part of a larger project addressing the impact of new procedural forms, I argue 
for shaping First Amendment doctrine in light of commitments that courts 
function as open, egalitarian venues. Even if the parties, judges, and other 
neutrals believe in the benefits of closure, and even when parties consent, court 
promotion of ADR, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, ought to be 
accompanied by public accountings of what transpires. The reasons stem from 
Judge Fuentes’s description of what was objectionable in the Delaware 
program—that it had “the air of [an] official State-run proceeding.”236 His 
insight merits expansion, for the presence of the state infuses all these forms of 
ADR, which are mandated, advocated, and structured through hundreds of 
court rules, government manuals, and websites, and are commended to litigants 
by judges. 
The result of these many new rules is not “bargaining in the shadow of the 
law,” but bargaining as a requirement of the law. The dispatchers are the 
                                                        
235  In the context of the federal system, federal judges doing so would either interpret the 
statute or local rule mandating confidentiality of ADR procedures as not addressing court-
annexed arbitration or hold it unconstitutional as applied to this genre of ADR. 
236  Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 522 (3d Cir. 2013) (Fuentes, J., 
concurring). 
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judges, who have either designated themselves as “neutrals” or appointed 
others and cloaked them in “quasi-judicial” authority, complete with 
immunities from suit and obligations of disqualification akin to that of judges. 
In some instances, as the certiorari petition on behalf of the Delaware judges 
explained, “active” or “senior judges” conduct “binding, confidential 
arbitrations in state courthouses.”237 In other instances, lawyers do so at judges’ 
behest. The point of structuring these procedures in courts is that, as both the 
Delaware judges and their supporters in seeking confidentiality explain, going 
to court “forces parties to comport themselves civilly, to assess their positions 
soberly, and to present their cases in a way that respects the other demands on 
the judge’s time.”238 
When courts offer such important civic moments, they should not be 
permitted, as a matter of constitutional law, to exclude the public, which has a 
right to see first-hand how conflicts in democracies can be handled, or to learn 
that judges and litigants fail to live up to obligations of fair, even-handed 
treatment and civil exchanges about deeply disputed views of fact and of law. 
As procedure is increasingly becoming contract, state-promoted contracting—
produced at the behest of the state and shaped through judicial intervention—
needs regulation through public oversight and participation. 
To date, the First Amendment access doctrine has focused on whether 
proceedings in court are trial-like, or predicates to trials. What the doctrine 
needs to take into account is that the touchstone of being trial-like is no longer 
a measure of what judges do in courts.239 Whether on trial, on the bench, or in 
less formal settings, judges in courts wield significant power, and many of the 
rationales supporting access explained. 
The issue is which activities ought to have what Justice Brennan termed the 
“public character of judicial proceedings.”240 A return to the explanations for 
access in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers is thus in order. The context was a 
closed criminal proceeding, and in finding the blanket closure unconstitutional, 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, spoke about the “nexus between 
openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness.”241 He commented further 
that “[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their 
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from 
observing.”242 The plurality opinion relied on the First Amendment as 
                                                        
237  Strine Petition for Certiorari, supra note 164, at 33. 
238  Strine TechNet Brief, supra note 200, at 8, citing to and extrapolating from the essay by 
Vice-Chancellor Strine, supra note 225, at 592–93. 
239  See Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of Int’l Law, Yale Law School, The Just, 
Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action?, Keynote Address at the 
Pennsylvania Law Review’s “Federal Rules at 75” Symposium (Nov. 16, 2013), in 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1525 (2014); Galanter & Frozena, supra note 75. 
240  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 592 (1980) (Brennan,  J., 
concurring). 
241  Id. at 570 (plurality opinion). 
242  Id. at 572. 
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implicitly guaranteeing access to criminal trials—prompting Justice Stevens to 
describe the case as a “watershed” for recognizing constitutional protection of 
“the acquisition of newsworthy matter.”243 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice 
Marshall, focused on how the holding supported the “right to gather 
information.”244 
The question in that case and at that time was the role played by trials. The 
question of our time is what in courts ought to be made public in the absence of 
trials. When, to borrow again from Judge Fuentes, does a process gain “the air 
of [an] official State-run proceeding”?245 Answers come from the reconfigured 
work of judges. When they convene meetings in courts, when they take on the 
role of “neutrals” or authorize others to do so with “quasi-judicial” status, their 
decisions and their procedures are the state, in action. As more of the activity of 
“the judicial” moves to become “quasi-judicial,” the public needs to be built in, 
so as to be able to be present at least some aspects of the proceedings and to 
know the results. 
A brief note on the practical implications is in order. Implementation of 
this obligation can be modeled after what takes place in the criminal context, 
just as the law on access to civil litigation regularly draws upon criminal 
analogues. In criminal cases, the law requires (albeit with uneven 
implementation) that the sequence of proceedings from arraignment and bail to 
trials or guilty pleas take place in public.246 While bargaining itself is generally 
off the record, the formal charges leveled against a defendant ex ante and the 
outcomes ex post are on the record. Further, constitutional law requires that 
before judges accept criminal defendants’ pleas, judges must inform defendants 
of the alternatives and of the consequences.247 Moreover, before a defendant 
can be sentenced, federal judges must “address themselves to the defendant” 
and provide a “personal invitation” for the defendant to speak before 
sentencing.248 In addition, given the potential for claims of ineffective 
assistance during plea bargaining,249 both judges and lawyers have incentives to 
document offers and acceptances by putting them on the record. 
The guilty plea model is far from ideal. The recitation of rights to trial and 
the inquiries on waiver are formulaic, and many defendants do not perceive 
themselves as having, and do not have, options—in light of the power of 
prosecutors. Yet the public exchanges at pleas and sentencing create knowledge 
                                                        
243  Id. at 582 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
244  Id. at 586. 
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of the decisions made and their consequences. The role of the judge is 
identified, and the actions taken are sometimes revised through subsequent 
proceedings. 
Thus, the constitutional mandates of rights of audience ought to be 
understood as entailing the political obligation that democratic orders subject 
government authority to public oversight, in both criminal and civil contexts. 
That obligation exists whether courts exercise that power through presiding at 
hearings and trials, imposing judgments. or through the promotion of private 
resolutions of claims brought to court. 
The alternative—the ADR in the making—is a privatized system of court-
based dispute resolution. Instead of functioning as contributors to the public 
sphere, courts shelter private exchanges that offer no forms of constraints on 
power or validation aside from participants’ reports of satisfaction. Gone are 
what Jeremy Bentham called “auditors,”250 for no one can assess the 
interactions between the decision-makers and the disputants and evaluate how 
resources affect outcomes, whether similarly-situated litigants are treated 
comparably, the impact of repeat players, and whether one would want to get 
into (or avoid) court. No outsider can gain “assurance that established 
procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known.”251 
Instead, control over the meanings of the claims made and the judgments 
rendered rests with the parties, oftentimes bound by confidentiality agreements 
about both processes and outcomes. 
To conclude, having accepted Professor Subrin’s invitation to be “thinking 
about . . . a country’s procedure,”252 I find myself mapping the deterioration of 
the democratic features that Professor Subrin outlined. As ADR processes 
come to dominate court-based dispute resolution, the power exercised by the 
state in civil proceedings retreats from the public purview, in a fashion 
paralleling the movement that Foucault traced in the shift away from public 
displays of state punishment and to closed prisons. We are watching (a word 
chosen deliberately) the dismembering of the procedural adjudicatory system 
shaped during the last century, when courts widened their doors to include all 
persons in the social ordering253 and to give them power through juridical 
opportunities to make claims in public. The new court-based ADR procedures 
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build in no external vantage point from which to assess the exchanges taking 
place under their rules and the kinds of outcomes reached. Debates about 
underlying obligations, the scope of remedies, and the role of the state are 
silenced. 
The foundation of the authority of judges is that their power to impose 
judgment comes from the structure of adjudication, its constraints, and its 
public character. Courts cannot shed their regulatory functions and remain 
robust institutions of authority. If the task of adjudication is replaced with that 
of shepherding parties toward private conciliation, the independence of judges 
becomes a goal without a purpose or a constraint. The result is the decline of 
adjudication’s potential to serve and to support democracies. 
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